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Abstract 
University: The American University in Cairo 
Thesis Title: Government and community efforts in Infrastructure Upgrading in Informal Areas: 
The Case of Izbit ElHaggana 
Student Name: Noura Wahby 
Advisors: Jennifer Bremer, Ph.D.; Khaled Amin Zakaria, Ph.D.; Khaled AbdelHamid, Ph.D.  
Realizing the magnitude of informality as a façon-de-vie in Cairo as in other megacities, this 
research focuses on the urban poor in their attempts to provide a decent standard of living using 
their own efforts, within the context of the lack of government engagement and limited 
resources. The purpose was to answer the research question how community organizations and 
state actors interact in providing key infrastructure in informal areas, taking Izbit ElHaggana 
as an area of study. The objective was to determine the processes of how community self-help 
schemes and government efforts to install and upgrade infrastructure in informal areas operate 
and are maintained. This thus allowed us to recognize quality and sustainability issues, as well as 
potential for integrated/inclusive upgrading policies; and whether the government can afford to 
reject informal infrastructure. Qualitative interviews were conducted with community members, 
government officials and experts on informality to provide holistic perceptions on the upgrading 
paradigm.  
The study findings provided an insight to two case studies of self-help water installations in the 
two districts of ElHaggana, as well as an insight into electricity and sewerage connections, 
regarding gehood zateya processes- incremental networking, innovation strategies, communal 
networks and self-sufficiency, sub-optimal quality, and sustainability. The findings also shed 
light on the themes of informal social structures and interaction with formal systems. The 
research indicates that local self-help initiatives often override non-functioning formal systems, 
while local governments stubbornly avoid collaboration as back participation in initiatives. In 
addition, community interviews presented citizens caught in a trap between the need to 
regularize and mistrust of formalization given the unstable official recognition. 
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Chapter 1- Background and Problem 
Statement 
Introduction 
The global community reached a population of 7 billion in 2011, which has since been exceeded 
and projections for 2050 exceed 9 billion easily (UNDESA, 2013). As the global village grows, 
so do its cities, some of which are now labeled “megacities” such as Mumbai, Dhaka, Karachi, 
Sao Paolo, Mexico City, Cairo and many others. With this expansion comes the great 
responsibility of urban planning and reform to keep up with the increasing numbers. It has been 
indicated that currently the urban population has reached 3 billion people and of this population, 
those living in informal areas constitute about a third and will witness a sharp growth trajectory 
(Belsky, 2012, p.40). As such it will be vital to look into the different issues relating to these 
areas and specifically how local governments are reacting to an unplanned expansion that they 
seem to have little control over. 
 Interest in informal areas has been alive for some time, although it focused mostly on 
"slum literature and reporting", documenting the lives of citizens living outside of their cities' 
norms and ideals. From the favelas in Brazil to the newest Dharvai-s of Mumbai, to the mysteries 
of Kibera and the "ashwaeyat" in Cairo; slums and their residents have been the topic of debate 
mostly on urban violence, resettlement policies, and finding solutions to the slum "problem" 
suffocating their host cities. It is debated that mostly due to donor interest have the urban poor 
been transformed into targets for questions on social justice, urban planning and citizenship 
rights. International recognition for the rights of the urban poor has started to emerge both in 
literature and in development programs advocating for accessibility to services, local governance 
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and accountability, and integrated/inclusive national policies. The move to recognizing the 
informal has begun on paper, but has barely materialized in developing countries such as Egypt. 
Yet, in light of the lack of rule of law, local formal systems and enforcement of 
regulations, in Egypt the informal areas and systems seem to becoming the norm of the city. 
Today about 63% of Cairo's population lives in informal areas, this constitutes over 11 million of 
the city’s population (Sims, 2009, p.91). Although the government has spent at least the last two 
decades attempting to ignore or resist the expansion of these areas, what is certain is that apart 
from the growth of desert communities that now house a small fraction of the population added 
to informal areas, the formal expansion of the city has all but stopped; whereas informal areas 
will continue to grow at a sustained rate for years to come, especially the peri-urban areas (Sims, 
2009, p.85). However, Egyptians outside these areas as well as the authorities continue to 
misunderstand informality, not realizing their potential or that this may be an opportune moment 
to invest in these areas rather than most certainly losing the battle of eliminating them. 
However, in order to realize this potential, one must look at how informal area residents 
make their lives and livelihoods. This means recognizing where illegality lies, the grey areas and 
faulty local enforcement, and informal systems of services that thrive under governmental 
absence. Very little research is dedicated to learning how communities in informal areas come 
together for self-sufficiency in the wake of government inefficiency and contempt.  
As such, there have been moves on behalf of the community to make their own systems 
by adapting formal systems to their needs without ‘legalization’. They types of initiatives have 
been named “self-help projects”, where the community uses its own resources, both human and 
financial; to improve their living conditions (GTZ, 2010, p.19) usually in the absence of 
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government intervention. Local self-help initiatives come in many different forms such as local 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) providing financial liquidity; revolutionary 
local defense committees for community protection; and local ad-hoc projects to provide 
essential services and even key infrastructure in many areas.  
This research focuses on documenting local self-help initiatives that have installed or 
upgraded utilities built to close the gap in government service provision. The study will mainly 
focus on how water piping projects operate and are maintained, using a specific area as a case 
study; and provide an insight to electricity and sewage connections, as well as recount 
community-government interactions. 
Self-evidently, informal areas are not all alike, though they share commonalities. 
According to the Ministry of Local Development, there were over 1,105 informal areas in Cairo 
alone in 2001 (Cities Alliance, 2008, p.7). After the collapse of Duwayqa, much attention was 
given to the squatter area of Manshiet Nasr in the Cairo governorate; while in Gizah Boulak 
elDakrour is better known to donors. Other areas may be mentioned in the news, usually 
detailing urban violence, like Izbit ElHaggana and Mit Okba; while others may be disregarded 
until a phenomenon too big to be ignored emerges. This is the case for the peri-urban areas in 
Gizah, which have recently been made famous by the sectarian violence in the village of el-
Khesoos, one of the fastest growing informal areas in Cairo.  
This research will focus on another squatter area that has been largely understudied- Izbit 
ElHaggana. Its proximity to the AUC provides reason for student responsibility towards its 
issues, and the author has previous research experience in the area, thus facilitating accessibility. 
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Also since most stories coming out of ElHaggana are about hired thugs or vote-selling, the self-
sufficiency story of a low-income group remains untold. 
Hence, this paper is divided into several sections that trace the current literature on urban 
upgrading and community participation, and detail the research done in Izbit ElHaggana. The 
background, statement of the problem and literature review will set the scene describing the 
progression of informality in Egypt, history of ElHaggana, interactions of residents with the 
authorities and the infrastructure dilemma; while placing the case within the wider sphere of 
literature on informality and community-led upgrading in other megacities. The next part will 
detail the data collection methodology which will lead on to the presentation of specific case 
studies, and analysis and discussion of the main themes. The paper will conclude with the 
implications these types of initiatives may have for urban policy-making and recommendations 
for future research opportunities. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Previous research on the urban poor in Egypt has focused on the key issues of informal 
workers, urban violence, housing policies, social security, and role of NGOs supporting the 
urban poor. Little attention has been paid to the issue of infrastructure in informal areas, 
unless related to housing issues. There is also a lack of narrative concerning the role of the 
community in shouldering the burden of installing infrastructure through self-help schemes. 
Some research has been completed on local government and its many complexities, yet 
there is few discussions on the dynamic relationship between frontline public officials and 
the community, whether in supporting or blocking the efforts of self-help projects. 
The main research question for this study is, "how do community organizations 
and state actors interact in providing key infrastructure in informal areas?" Answering 
this question will lead to recognizing issues related to the quality and sustainability of self -
help infrastructure in informal areas; as well as the potential prospects for integrated and 
inclusive infrastructure upgrading policies. 
The specific case study chosen for this study is Izbit ElHaggana, which has rarely 
been the topic of academic research and interventions by the government or formal civil 
society. There are numerous studies looking at informal areas that have gained popular 
attention such as Manshiet Nasr, Stabl Antar, Duwayqa, Zabaleen areas, Telal Zeinhom etc. 
mostly due to interventions by donors or government programs. Thus, looking at Izbit 
ElHaggana, one of the largest informal areas as well as one of the oldest places for 
communities to set up their livelihoods, will add a complementary perspective to these 
areas.  
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 This study will focus on analyzing two projects implemented in Izbit ElHaggana 
related to installing key infrastructure, namely water piping installations. The main 
investigative questions that the research tackles in each of these projects are as follows: 
- What and how are community-led efforts implemented in Izbit ElHaggana? 
- Where and how do local governments and utility services react and complement/upgrade 
these initiatives? 
- To what extent and how are informal efforts integrated into the formal system? 
The answers found to address each of these questions will provide insight into the 
project lifecycle of community intervention and the role of the state, qualifying their 
dynamic relationship. In addition, insights will be provided on the electric and sewage 
connections adopted by the community in the same area. 
As a means to map out the current situation regarding interventions in informality in 
general, Figure 1 illustrates both the factors and actors involved in local paradigms. The 
inner circle depicts three main actors- the government, donors and the community. While 
the larger encompassing box details some of the deciding factors that influence these actors’ 
interventions, such as the legal and institutional set up on the government side; as well as 
topography, resources and culture influencing the community. The investigation of this 
study will focus on the shaded boxes of community and governmental efforts. These are 
detailed in the conceptual framework of the infrastructure upgrading processes in Figure 2 
which traces the main interventions of the governmental and community interventions; as 
well as the duality in the government’s stance. The study’s case studies will be able to 
validate this framework and its interpretation of reality.   
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Background 
This section will provide the setting of the research with regards to informality in Egypt, the 
legal and institutional context, and an in-depth look at the target study area- Izbit ElHaggana. 
Cairene Informality: the Norm? 
Historically, in 1950 the whole of Cairo could be considered as formal, i.e. the modes of growth 
were mainly legal (Sims, 2012, p.46). The poor lived in state housing or deteriorated traditional 
areas, and then began the expansion to what were then villages of Mit Okba, Imbaba etc. (Sims, 
2012, p.49). The state continued to build public housing projects that provided affordable living 
conditions for the workers coming into the newly built factories of Helwan and other centers 
(Sims, 2012, pp.49-50).  As the city grew in the 1970s, informal urban growth on agricultural 
land increased although the government did not offer any kind of resistance (GTZ, 2010, p.3), 
and two urban areas- Manshiet Nasr and Izbit ElHaggana, became locations for squatters. The 
90s marked the era where the government began to take action in informal areas, first by 
considering them a security threat with the spread of extremism, then a presidential decree 
enforcing the “right to infrastructure” (GTZ, 2010, p.3). This marked the beginnings of Cairo’s 
informality which would expand to ultimately dominate the formal city today. [See Annex 1 and 
Annex 2]. 
Different studies have taken place to research and quantify the informality phenomenon in 
Cairo. The French Center for Economic, Legal and Social Studies (Centre d’Études et de 
Documentation Économiques, Juridiques et Sociales) (CEDEJ) estimated the annual increase at 
3.4 per cent in informal areas' extent, and a 3.2 per cent rate of population growth (Sims, 2012, 
p.69). [See Annex 3] Recently, a study was carried out in which residents were asked to identify 
whether they considered their neighborhood to be an informal area ashwaye’ya or not (Sims, 
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2012, p.33). The resultant personalized responses showed that 41% of residents believed they 
live in informality, with Cairo scoring a higher rank of 44% (Sims, 2012, p.33).  This is a 
qualitative indication of how Cairenes’ feel they live in circumstances that they consider 
informal. Ultimately today there are more than 11 million inhabitants living in informal areas, 
and they only occupy 17% of the land designated as Greater Cairo (Sims, 2012, pp.91-96). 
It is important to note that not all those who live in informal areas are poor. Due to the 
local housing costs these areas are also attractive to “young middle class, educated families, 
university students and public-sector employees” (Piferro, 2010, p.5). Although the usual 
informal area problems of “overcrowding, lack of infrastructure, and violence” prevail, these 
areas are characterized by being vibrant and having the social cohesion and networks that are 
lacking in many of the city’s formal areas (Amnesty, 2011, p.12). 
Legal and Institutional Setting 
Laws relating to housing and informality date back to 1951 when Law 206 governing “state-
aided social housing” was promulgated (Sims, 2012, p.50). Most laws are connected to 
prohibition of residents to infringe on state control land (Article 372bis of the Penal Code) 
(Amnesty, 2011, p.30) or agricultural areas. For example, Construction on agricultural land was 
prohibited by the Law on Agriculture of 1966 (Amnesty, 2011, p.12) and in 1996, two decrees 
were issued that stipulated that “any new building on agriculture land and any urban construction 
without permit would be severely punished by military courts” (Sims, 2012, p.68). This 
ultimately resulted in more local corruption with local officials who exacted more money to turn 
a blind eye. Yet administrative courts have generally ruled in favor of the residents when it 
comes to forced evictions and resettlement (Amnesty, 2011, p.30). 
17 
 
The main program of the government that encompasses the vision for the urban future of 
the country is the National Housing Program (NHP), which was initiated as part of ex-President 
Mubarak’s 2005 electoral campaign. There is also the envisioned plan of Cairo 2050 that has 
been met with sharp criticism from a multitude of experts as being completely unreasonable as 
the plans in reality would mean the removal of millions of inhabitants to remake a Dubai-an 
Cairo (Sims, 2012, p.279).  
A multitude of organizations are currently involved in the urban planning of the country, 
and these have been restructured after the Revolution. These include the Ministry of Housing, 
and Urban Communities, the newly formed Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities the 
General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP); the relevant Governorate office; the urban 
upgrading units as part of the local administration/municipality; the utilities’ Holding 
Companies- Water, Electricity and Sewage (including their local affiliates); and most recently 
the establishment of the Informal Settlements Development Facility, as a response to the 
Duwayqa tragedy in 2008 with a mandate to identify and categorize ‘unsafe areas’ as well as 
carrying out projects to ameliorate their situation. Of course, due to the overlap of governmental 
mandates, the Ministries of Local Development, Local Administration and Planning may also 
have roles in these processes. Taking Sims's analogy, the government seems to be running on 
auto-pilot when it comes to urban management, yet its underlying “minimalist” systems continue 
to function allowing the city to grow (Sims, 2012, p.257).   
Policy Change 
In the 1970s, when the government finally began to realize the extent of informality in Cairo, a 
series of decrees and orders made it illegal to build on agriculture land (Sims, 2012, p.66). 
However, this resulted in the state, which was incapable of enforcement, being pushed into the 
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area of “petty bribes” and the grey overlap of formal and informal (Sims, 2012, p.66). Yet as 
these areas grew the government began to indirectly recognize these areas by giving in to 
provide basic services, complementing the self-help structures gehood zateya (literally personal 
efforts/investment) already in place (Sims, 2012, p.68). The government continued to veer 
between the two extremes of recognizing and discouraging informality. For example in 2006, the 
Governor of Cairo announced that utilities will be connected to any buildings that are in 
violation as a “temporary measure” (Sims, 2012, p.130); but the government was still stuck in its 
“containment” policies to try to limit informal growth on the peripheries (GTZ, 2010, p.4). The 
2008 Duwayqa rock slide may have brought about the IDSF and upgrading policies, yet projects 
like Cairo 2050 envision their complete replacement (GTZ, 2010, p.4). As such both general 
policies towards informality and infrastructure have been inherently intertwined by both the 
national and local government. 
Izbit ElHaggana 
Formation 
As early as 1887, scattered residences started to appear in what is now Izbit ElHaggana (area 
resident, personal communication), and the core of the informal area started in the 1930s with the 
settlement of the families of the border-patrol. The area really began to take off in the 1970s, 
however (Sims, 2012, p.64). Its named translates literally to the “village of ElHaggana”, who 
were the troops taken from “Nubian and Sudanese (Camel Corps) and living on Egypt’s southern 
border”, but whose presence in the area is now very minimal (Bremer, 2013, p.14). The area’s 
growth corresponded to the development of informality across Cairo, which accelerated with the 
upsurge of migration from rural areas (in particular Minya in ElHaggana's case), but many 
residents in ElHaggana are Cairenes themselves who were attracted to the concept of having 
their own land and building their own houses (interviews with residents’ interviews). Some of 
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these areas include ElZawya ElHamra, ElWayli and ElSayeda Zainab (residents’ interviews). 
When coming in to ElHaggana, they simply bought land from an informal dealer, set their 
borders using stones and would be guaranteed land protection by the dealer until they came to 
permanently settle down (Residents’ interviews). This is typical of an informal area that is 
formed through squatter activity that develops into a housing and later on a rental market, 
Manshiet Nasr is another example. Today the area is almost all completely constructed with 
towers in some areas that can go up to 15 stories; informal businesses are thriving in the main 
ElWorsha road and side streets, ranging from furniture shops, motorcycle repair shops, kiosks, 
hairdressers etc., to small workshops such as carpenters, tailors, and the like. Indeed it is as 
vibrant as any formal area in Cairo. 
 There has been much controversy about the population of ElHaggana. The area covered 
is about 11 kilometers squared [Annex 4], and Soliman first indicated in 2002 that it may house 
at least 1 million residents (p.179). However, more recent estimates have placed it to contain 
around 300,000 - 500,000 residents (Bremer, 2013, p.17), even though residents claim as many 
as 1.2 million live there. Surrounding ElHaggana are military lands and the formal area of 
Madinet Nasr, while the area itself is located on desert land that has been the scene of a tug-of-
war among the military, the Cairo governorate, Madinet Nasr Housing and Development (long a 
public sector company, but now predominantly private) and the residents (Residents’ 
interviews). 
Evolution of Services 
When the residents first started to move to the area, they were mostly bringing in their own 
infrastructure with them. Due to a complete lack of services and utilities, residents went through 
a variety of phases until they had finally established a more or less stable system. Bremer (2013) 
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divides these into four stages beginning with a pioneer phase where non-permanent residents 
used ad-hoc systems of bringing in water from Cairo and using kerosene for miscellaneous 
activities (p.20). Followed by the second stage of rudimentary systems in which the military or 
innovative small businessmen decided to sell water to the residents, electrical boards connecting 
to the main frame were set up with a nail per house, and septic tanks were homemade. The third 
phase marked the beginning of the residents coming together to develop self-help systems such 
as running water pipes from the main connections to provide private household supply. While 
the fourth and currently continuing stage, is where the government makes its “official” entry into 
the area and installs its own electricity connections and meters, water piping, and sewage piping 
and manholes (Bremer, 2013, p.20). 
 Although it may seem that the government only becomes involved at a later stage, there 
are several avenues where the authorities play a role in both acknowledging and resisting 
community efforts. This will be discussed in further details in the analysis section.  
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Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Having looked briefly at informality in Egypt, across the globe there exists a plethora of 
literature, research, policies and stories on and from the urban poor, both in the realms of 
academia and professional practice. This section will attempt to include both types of narratives, 
with particular focus on examples from the Global South. It is divided into two main parts- the 
first will look at the broader context discussing informality and infrastructure upgrading, as well 
as looking at participatory approaches and inclusive upgrading systems. The second part will 
look at the regional and local contexts while focusing on the interactions of formal and informal 
systems, and the relevance to the case in Cairo. 
Megacities and Informal Urbanization 
Megacities are defined as cities with over 10 million in population. In 2010, there were 21 such 
cities, doubling from 10 in 1990; and 7 percent of the world' population reside in them (Belsky, 
2012, p.40). Yet about 3 billion people reside in all urban cities across the globe, and as per 
UNHABITAT about 828 million (863 as per the MDG website) people live in what it defined as 
slums, housing a third of the urban population (Belsky, 2012, p.40). As such urbanization is 
expanding along a different trajectory of which informal urban development is dominating, and 
"one of which governments are ill-prepared for" (Sims, 2009, p.269). It is also predicted that in 
the next 30 years there will be around 2 billion slum dwellers (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.xxv). 
 Much controversy has plagued the term "slum" and how it has been used. There has been 
a noted shift from the negative connotation to inclusiveness which has also been reflected in the 
transformation of negative approaches of attempting to erase slums, to upgrading of informal 
areas. In the Egyptian context itself, the state differentiates between unsafe areas, slums, 
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unplanned/informal areas and each has an associated policy and strategy, whether upgrading 
evictions, or resettlements (ISDF website, 2012). Law 119 for 2008 on the other hand, makes 
two classifications of unplanned areas and areas of redevelopment (inner-city slums, shanty 
town) which also includes unsafe areas (GTZ, 2010, p.4). 
Putting aside terminologies, ultimately as Mike Davis puts in his controversial book 
“Planet of Slums”- ‘”slums warehouse surplus humanity” across the globe and the ensuing 
conditions are the main issue (Satterthwaite, 2006, p.27). The urban poor live in areas that are 
considered below standard city conditions including high crime, continued housing insecurity, 
crowded living areas, lack of access or poor quality of water, sanitation, healthcare and education 
etc. (Belsky, 2012, p.41). These conditions have caused an avalanche of programs and initiatives 
directed to improve standards of living as well as develop governance paradigms with local 
governments. The main themes for which most of these initiatives are related to are either urban 
policies or environmental sustainability. For instance, goal seven of the MDGs,  the most high-
profile global collaboration which targets social and environmental sustainability,  has the 
specific target (7.D) of "By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers" (MDG website, 2013). The organization believes it has met this 
target as the share of urban slum residents in the South decreased from 39% in 2000 to 33% in 
2012, and over 200 million have better access to services (MDG website, 2013). Also, UN-
HABITAT, a main organization in the field, created the Sustainable cities Program as early as 
the 1990s to address growth and equity in cities (Belsky, 2012, p.41). Other such programs 
include the Cities Alliance, UNHABITAT’s Urban Management Programme, different types of 
Municipal Development Programs such as those by CARE and the Canadian International 
Development Agency, the World Bank's range of infrastructure programs and others. 
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These programs have diversified aims and sectors that range from directly installing 
services in slums, to developing policies and training local municipalities on urban management 
and decentralization They all fall under the growing mindset that "the urban poor are important 
elements of the urban economy and society; thus aiming to harness their potential to contribute 
to economic growth” (Belsky, 2012, p.39). This comes a long way from the traditional negative 
policies that were advocated for by donors and adopted by national countries such as forced 
eviction and involuntary resettlement (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.xxvi). As this research focuses on 
infrastructure, the following section will look at how infrastructures issues have been tackled in 
the literature and in development programs. 
Infrastructure in Informal Areas 
Infrastructure is generally qualified as being the building blocks that constitute people’s daily 
lives which includes- roads, bridges, electrical structures, water and sanitation installations, 
telephone connections etc. In developed countries, cities spend 32 times per person on 
infrastructure than those in the developing world (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.113).   As part of the 
efforts to address infrastructure, another MDG target under its seventh goal of environmental 
sustainability focuses in particular on water as it targets  to "Halve, by 2015, the proportion of 
the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation" (MDG 
website). According to its indicators, there continues to be 2.5 billion people in developing 
countries that lack access to improved sanitation (MDG website). There have also been claims 
from various governments and international agencies that access to water and sanitation has 
almost been achieved in most of its cities, and lack of accessibility lies in the rural areas. 
However, according to Satterthwaite (2003), literature seems “to underestimate the scale and 
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depth of urban poverty”, as these statistics fit with their belief that rural poverty is in fact more 
important than urban issues (p.184). At the same time, statistics may not shed light on issues 
inherent to the usage of these infrastructures such as quality of the structures, ease of access, 
quality of water, regularity of supply and cost. (Satterthwaite, 2003, p.186). As such it is 
important to understand how infrastructure systems are planned and operate in informal areas, as 
well as recognize accompanying issues to accessibility. 
 To begin with, infrastructure projects are mostly planned at the regional level, usually 
bypassing local communities and CDAs working in slum areas (Belsky, p.42). These can include 
water and sanitation systems, electricity, and transportation systems. There has been great 
investment in the 1990s in clean water, but accessibility has not kept up (UNHABITAT, 2003, 
p.114). A potential hindrance for this dilemma is the lack of enabling policies  and coordination 
between governmental institutions and accountability, which are all part of ineffective good 
governance principles, especially at the local level (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.131). In addition, 
local government’s capacities to coordinate and effectively implement upgrading policies are 
also weak (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.136). They are mostly concerned with installing new 
facilities, but often fail to uphold their maintenance, and thus give leeway for international 
donors and NGOs to take the lead in many of these cases (Belsky, 2012, p.43). Although most 
efforts focus on improved housing, there are certain donors that are especially interested in 
infrastructure such as the USAID, the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation program and the GIZ 
Participatory Development Program in Egypt. Also, the UK’s DFID has been involved with the 
Indian government to provide city-wide water supplies; and the Swiss International Development 
Agency has tackled the vacuum of social services in these areas (UNHABITAT, 2003, p.143). 
Hence, there is a key need for a “new paradigm for the role of government in managing, 
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directing and facilitating private investment” in order to be a part of the ongoing process of 
infrastructure upgrading and a key partner (Belsky, 2012, -.43).  
 Among the different literature on infrastructure, the World Bank’s diverse series, such as 
Gridlines, and reports dominate. These include a study done to evaluate the infrastructure 
projects of the bank after 20 years of working in the field (World Bank, 2006a). What is 
interesting to note is that only a few pages are dedicated to the social impact of these projects and 
local public engagement, while financial sustainability and outcomes at the national level 
dominate. In addition, the institution also releases various toolkits and benchmarking guides that 
aim to set standards for infrastructure interventions, and disseminate experiences on private-
public partnerships (PPP) (World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2008; World Bank 2006b). 
 However, criticisms ensue about the effectiveness of how these different programs aim to 
upgrade or install infrastructure. The various approaches adopted by different stakeholders are 
discussed as follows. 
Approaches to Infrastructure Upgrading 
Throughout the literature there is reference to different types of tactics used to tackle 
infrastructure in slums. Some of the main types identified include “Servicing informal areas” by 
installing different types of systems such as paving and lighting and sanitation infrastructure; 
“Sectorial upgrading” focusing on just one type of service; “planning and partial adjustment” to 
widen main streets and create public areas; “on-site redevelopment of informal areas” through 
demolition and re-settlement within the area itself; “redevelopment and relocation” which is 
mostly identified with eviction and resettlement policies (GTZ, 2010, pp.6-8). The following 
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sub-sections will provide a summary of these interventions according to the actor leading the 
initiative. 
Government-led Interventions 
The perceived notion is that governments should provide basic services and structures that would 
allow its citizens to live a dignified life. However, in this lie several questions such as which 
government- local or national, prioritization of target areas, availability of resources, 
implementation contracts and local engagement. These are especially significant when dealing 
with slum intervention since authorities will be particularly wary to put resources in areas where 
“land ownership rights have yet to be firmly established” (Belsky, 2012, p.38). Most of the 
earlier approaches were thus based on the concept of force eviction, direct confrontation with 
“settlers” and resettlement into areas that eventually turn into slum remakes. Many developing 
countries have now turned to upgrading informal areas as they have come to realize that 
acceptance of the status quo is in many cases less costly and reduces social upheavals. 
Governments also have an added layer of internal dilemmas where coordination and 
decision-making between agencies at the national and municipal levels comes into play (Belsky, 
2012, p.42).  This is highlighted in countries that have a multitude of agencies involved in the 
urban process, as well as the degree of centralization. For example Egypt alone has several state 
holding companies, a ministry of housing and another for utilities, and special agencies such as 
the Informal Settlements Development Facility; all tackling issues in informal areas. Yet, while 
this type of interaction takes place, there is complete marginalization of slum communities even 
though the poor may have the best knowledge of at least where new infrastructure should be 
placed (Belsky, 2012, p.42). Thus they frequently disregard smaller-scale infrastructure 
investments that may support inclusive and sustainable urban development (Belsky, 2012, p.42) 
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and simply go about doing what they have traditionally done without consultation and regardless 
of consequences. Interestingly, a common connotation used to sum up government interventions 
that has been repeated both in the literature and by urban experts such as David Sims in Egypt is 
“muddling through”.  UNHABITAT has identified the failure of the state on two levels- 
governance due to a lack of political will to effectively tackle the issue at hand; as well as legal 
and institutional failure, where governments have not kept up with all of citizens’  needs and is 
not flexible enough to change both policies and implementation mandates (UNHABITAT, 2003, 
pp.5-7). This has thus made space for donor-led interventions to come in as discussed below. 
Donor-led Interventions 
In the wake of the vacuum created by governments in dealing with informal areas, many 
initiatives are being led by donor or NGO based efforts that focus on improving living conditions 
of the poor, through housing and community infrastructure (Belsky, 2012, p.43). One of the most 
highlighted programs is the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program that is implemented 
particularly in Asia for infrastructure upgrading (WSP, 2008). Since many international 
organizations and governments have committed to the achievement of the MDGs, this means that 
they are bound to outcome-based initiatives that have to be implemented with the aim of quantity 
results. At the same time, institutional reforms are already occurring in both governments and 
these organizations in order to implement these practices, however most ignore local processes 
and what the poor may actually need, apart from the occasional public participation method. It is 
said that these top-down approaches are merely “putting a shelter over poverty” (Satterthwaite, 
2003, p.183). This will be further discussed in the next section.  
However, the dilemma many bilateral organizations and international institutions face is 
that if they do invest in mobilizing local resources, this would eventually cut costs of their 
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projects and thus reduce the loans and funding allocations to these donors (Satterthwaite, 2003, 
p.183). ).  At the same time, according to Wateraid (2008), the investments donors have made in 
sanitation schemes seem to miss reaching urban slums altogether as only 1% of urban 
development aid budgets focus on the urban poor (p.4). 
Privatization Efforts 
A different approach to provide basic services that has organically emerged is small-scale private 
service providers. These providers constitute part of the public-private partnership (PPP) 
methodologies that have become commonplace. These usually take place when a private firm is 
involved in “management contracts, leases, affermages, concessions, and divestitures” (World 
Bank, (2006b, xiii). The Water and Sanitation Program by the World Bank is particularly active 
in this as it has started a Small Water Utilities Improvement and Financing Project (SWIF) in 
both Asia and Africa, as well as established a Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF) to support these efforts (WSP, 2010; PPIAF, 2006).The long term vision is to allow 
these providers to become the “local operators of existing public networks in small towns” and 
begin the process of “leveraging private investment in infrastructure”  (PPIAF, 2006, p.4). Yet, 
the underlying dilemma of this approach is that these local operators can be in the profiteering 
business of upholding informality, and are obstacles to local governance systems. Yet this is one 
of the facets of participatory methods in urban management, which is further explored below. 
Shift to Participation 
As such there seems to be at face value concerted efforts to achieve the MDG goals and begin to 
address the real issues facing the urban poor, however the missing link seems to be the 
involvement of local organizations and stakeholder engagement. As Satterthwaite puts in, there 
should be a move to “meet […] the MDGs from the Bottom up” (p.112), which means that there 
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should be more emphasis on getting resources to those doing the work locally (2005). This 
means that instead of bilateral organizations paying donor funds to national governments that 
have committed to more than a decade of “good governance” and decentralization, it is crucial to 
include local organizations that can range from community development associations (CDAs) to 
local government agencies and urban poor groups (Satterthwaite, 2005, pp.102-105). By 
developing a participatory approach that engages the affected local stakeholders, the chances of 
upgrading and improving informal areas is much higher (GTZ, 2010, p.8). Hence the types of 
inclusive strategies exploited for upgrading informal areas are discussed in the following section.  
Inclusive upgrading systems- the way forward? 
Practitioners adopting previous top-bottom approaches slowly realized that the lack of 
comprehensive planning and implementation with engagement by the poor limited any 
development in realistically addressing their needs (Belsky, 2012, p.44). As such inclusive 
development and policies in the realm of infrastructure upgrading are today the center of focus in 
most targeted programs, specifically on how they contribute to the economic engines of national 
growth as well as improving institutional arrangements (Belsky, 2012, p.41). Different faces of 
participation have thus appeared and are discussed as follows. 
Participatory Approaches 
The concept of participation has evolved in recent history taking on different forms and 
nomenclature. In the 1950s to the 60s, the concept of community development began, but the 
real inception of “people’s participation” in development was readdressed in the 70s as a 
response for growing awareness in rural development (De Campos Guimaraes, 2009, pp.4-5). 
The World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD), in Rome 
1979, declared it a ‘basic human right’ that rural people should participate in the governing of 
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their lives and thus since then participation has been described as the “new orthodoxy of 
development” (De Campos Guimaraes, 2009, p.5). As such governments, donors and 
international organizations have adopted different shades of participation including “bottom-up 
planning, acknowledging indigenous knowledge, and claiming to empower local people” (De 
Campos Guimaraes, 2009, p.5). However, in urban management as with other fields, how this 
has been implemented leaves much to be desired at the local level as the following will explore. 
One of the main problems with using experts to implement “solutions” for local 
development is that they “lack knowledge of the specifities of each city or neighborhood, and 
lack engagement with the local population” (Satterthwaite, 2003, p.183). This thus poses an 
obstacle as they cannot recommend policies that would benefit those affected and with the least 
resources, including those that are “designed and implemented by the poor themselves” 
(Satterthwaite, 2003, p.183). Hence practitioners have turned to “participation in housing and 
urban service management” where voluntary contributions by different stakeholders including 
the consumers are part of the decision-making processes and defining the quality of services 
provided (Nour, 2011, p.80).  This includes methodologies such as participatory planning 
techniques, stakeholder focus groups, community monitoring and evaluation etc.   
 As mentioned previously, Private-Public Partnerships (PPP) seem to make up the bulk of 
literature on participation in infrastructure upgrading, although it seems that just including more 
than one stakeholder in an aid-led intervention constitutes as participation. To look at this, a 
large study by the World Bank evaluated its different PPP water projects in Asia and Africa that 
have been implemented as early as the 1990s (Marin, 2009). An interesting recommendation that 
was indicated in the reports was that the projects “need to be made more pro-poor” (Marin, 2009, 
p.134); which thus reduces their credibility as being real local partnerships. Another program 
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that may have taken partnerships to a better level is the Slum Sanitation Program (SSP), part of 
the Bombay Sewage Disposal Project, implemented as part of a World Bank loan. This program 
actually included “demand-led participation” and proceeded to link municipalities, communities 
and the local private sector (World Bank, 2006c, p.1). In addition, the concept of self-help 
systems within upgrading policies has been identified, but is rarely sustained after the withdrawal 
of donors (UNHABITAT, 2003). Thus is participation the answer? 
Failed silver bullet? 
Nonetheless, there is a growing area in literature that critiques these so-called participatory 
approaches and questions the depth of their engagement with the community. As scholars begin 
to study how these so-called participatory programs operate, it seems that they have been mostly 
“consultative rather than actually participatory” (Gasparre, 2011, p.785). They qualify “real 
participation” as projects where informal area residents are involved in both negotiation and 
compromise processes with local governments (Gasparre, 2011, p.785). An example of this the 
Sri Lankan program “1.5 Million Houses Programme” (1990-1994) where the state assisted 
families to build their own houses through loan-finance and local collaborations in “decision-
making, planning, design, construction, capacity-building etc.” (Gasparre, 2011, p.785).  At the 
same time, there are already intrinsic obstacles to inclusive urban development that have to  be 
recognized including “the dearth of public resources and ability to mobilize private investment; 
profiteers from the status quo clashing with slum upgrading and improvement strategies; lack of 
municipal capacity to make and implement comprehensive plans to alleviate poverty” etc. 
(Belsky, 2012, pp.48-49). This hence brings us to the idea of community-based initiatives, which 
take bottom-up development to a different level. 
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Community-based Initiatives 
Having seen the problems with the participatory labeled programs, Satterthwaite has pointed out 
in most of his writings as early as 199,6 that what is been ignored is the efforts the poor people 
themselves exert regardless of any intervention (The Guardian). As Belsky indicates- "From 
mega-projects to micro-finance and the investments the poor themselves make in housing and 
microenterprises, private investment shapes the city" (Belsky, 2012, p.44). UNHABITAT 
reported that in almost every partnership in informal areas, there are initiatives that are self-
managed (2003, p.186). As such why have programs not recognized the potential of this 
investment and included it within their programs? Indeed, the concept is not new as John FC 
Turner has been advocating for support indigenous initiatives since the first Habitat conference 
in 1976 (Satterthwaite, 1996). 
The strategy basically entails of supporting the capacities of local community groups to 
manage their own urban service development, recognize their rights to housing and urban 
improvements, and build on their self-organization potential (Nour, 2011, p.80). This will 
include mobilization of local resources, participation in “demand analysis” and selection of 
solutions, as well as organizational efforts for implementation, operation and maintenance (Nour, 
2011, p.81). It is clear for example in the case of Mumbai that if the city moves to establish 
partnerships with urban poor organizations to collaborate and find solutions to improving 
conditions instead of the multitude of forced evictions that backfire, this will definitely better 
contribute to the city’s success (Satterthwaite, 2005, pp.104-105). One of the better known 
models is also described in the next section. 
Different actors have become involved in providing support of community-based 
initiatives led by residents of informal areas in varying degrees; including CDAs, NGOs, 
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bilateral organizations and donors (Gasparre, 2011, p.782). In the government’s case, the need to 
be involved in these initiatives gives light to a “back/reverse participation” approach where it is 
the state that tries to find entry points into informal processes. This is particularly interesting as it 
implicitly touched upon in the study case studies. On the donor side, however; one such example 
is the Community-Driven Development program by the World Bank, which seems to be a step in 
this direction even though its experiences dates back as early as the 1970s  (Gasparre, 2011, 
p.787; Nitti & Dahiya, 2004). Yet what is interesting about the philosophy behind this program is 
that the Bank identifies an “appropriate level of participation” and does not assume that 
increased participation is necessarily “better” (Gasparre, 2011, p.787). At the same time it 
continues to assume that there will be an “external party that mobilizes the community” 
(Gasparre, 2011, p.788) and the community itself is incapable of that on its own.  
 Nonetheless, it is also important not to romanticize the potential of such initiatives since 
they also face inherent challenges such as the mobilization of modest resources, difficulties in 
linking to the municipal formal systems etc. (Nour, 2011, P.80). In addition, in informal areas 
such as those in Cairo that are characterized by high density and low social cohesion, community 
participation will be particularly limited (Nour, 2011, p.85). This is why GTZ in Egypt has 
weaved community-based development as part of a more integrated participatory approach. This 
is where they include decentralization, institutionalization, and capacity development as 
prerequisites of participatory upgrading, which has a diversity of mechanisms with stakeholder 
engagement (GTZ, 2010, pp.12-14). A critique of this program will be looked at later on, 
whereas an initiative that has become popular among community-based approaches advocates is 
detailed as follows. 
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Best practices- The Orangi Pilot Project 
One of the most successful models that have been referred to c in the literature is the case of the 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi Pakistan. Established in the 1980s, a Pakistani NGO 
worked to provide a solution to sewage and drainage in an informal area called Orangi. This 
model is thus an example of a type of participatory strategy that is “area-based” whereby a 
defined area is the “frame of reference for the development efforts” (Nour, 2011, p.80). What is 
significant about this project is that a local model of drain construction was developed which is 
affordable to low-income households (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.116). The model has since spread to 
other informal areas in Karachi and other urban cities in the country and has deeply impacted 
how official provision of services worked (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.116). The project has allowed 
for the creation of local CDAs that work on operating and maintaining the implemented drainage 
systems, and the original NGO has even evolved to being a Research and Training Institute and a 
local trust fund has been created for the community (Hasan, 2008). It is also important to note 
that it was the financing of the local communities that helped develop this affordable model, 
which has helped local governments develop and adopt these lower-cost methodologies (Hasan, 
2008, p.109), and talks of devolution policies to municipalities are also in the making. The 
project has also attracted international donors’ support and been a target for their collaboration 
and praise. 
A recent development that also shows how interventions are intrinsically related to fate of 
local workers is the murder of the head of OPP Parveen Rehman (BBC, 14 March 2013).  She 
had served at the head of OPP from 1999, and was shot in Orangi itself as she was in her car 
while investigating land use around Karachi, which has always been deadly in the urban realm. 
35 
 
Having set the scene of global programs and defining literature, the second part of thi 
chapter will look at the regional context of infrastructure upgrading, the case of Cairo and how 
informal systems can override official systems. In addition to a discussion of how the literature 
relates to the case studies at hand and the identified research gap. 
MENA context 
Social development in the Middle East has always been qualified as being a step behind progress 
in Latin America and Asia, usually being linked to the lack of democratic transformation. 
However, urban management has long been a focus in the region, especially in countries with 
larger populations such as Egypt. Various studies and programs being implemented mostly 
tackle land issues and housing. For example in the recent book by Ababsa et al., urban land 
tenure in different contexts are looked at across the region including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey (2012). The World Bank programs are especially active in the region and 
thus there has been a slight shift from housing to infrastructure issues such as in Yemen (Asia 
News Monitor, 2010); and Morocco (World Bank website, 2013). There are also a multitude of 
UN agencies helping the region to achieve Target 10 of the MDGs relating to water and 
sanitation including UNICEF and WHO. Yet they are being criticized to have over-inflated 
coverage rates in the region as a study indicates that they undermine problems relating to 
accessibility, quality, affordability etc. (Zawahri et al., 2011, p.1153). Additionally, there is a 
patch of literature from the region that focuses on the intertwining realm of identity and urban 
informality, such as in Israeli cities with large Palestinian communities, and the case of Beirut 
where ethnicity politics figures strongly (Soliman, 2008, p.15). Cairo being a megacity also 
features heavily in the literature as detailed below. 
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Informality in Cairo 
The literature on informality and slums in Cairo is particularly vast. Classified as one of the 
globe’s megacities Cairo houses all types of issues that both scholarly articles and programs are 
developed to address. The field was originally dominated by urban planners and architects which 
resulted in large body of literature on housing, land tenure, urban designs and descriptions of the 
formation of the informal areas in the metropolis (Sims in UNHABITAT, 2003; Cities Alliance, 
2008; Soliman, 2002; Soliman, 2012). There is also a category of literature on dwellers’ rights in 
light of the government’s forced eviction practices and urban violence (Amnesty International, 
2009&2011; Shaw et al., 2011). However, recently more light has been shed on other 
interdisciplinary fields within the Cairene urban management field. This is where issues of 
inequality, local governance and government set-up, decentralization, and corruption etc. all 
come together to complement the housing story (Khadr et al., 2010; Sabry, 2008&2010). Urban 
upgrading and community participation have also been tackled but mostly by institutions 
working in these fields.  
Many institutions are involved in Cairo’s informal areas and in some cases in slum 
upgrading. These include the French Cooperation’s CEDEJ, UNHABITAT, AUC’s Social 
Research Center, the Japanese Cooperation Agency (JICA), USAID’s Helwan New Community 
which is supported by USAID (Gasparre, 2011, p.786); civil society organizations such as the 
MAAN cooperative, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and others; as well as the 
government’s own National Housing policies and organizations. A diversity of publications of 
these programs are available (PDP, 2009; PDP, 2010) as well as criticisms of the aid-led 
interventions and the level of community participation involved (Zetter et al., 2013).  
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Of these one of the most renowned programs in the Egyptian urban sphere is the 
Participatory Local Development Program (PDP) implemented by the German Aid cooperation 
in Egypt (GIZ, previously GTZ). This program started as far back as 1999 focusing on the areas 
of Boulaq ElDakrour and Manshiet Nasr. The interventions planned changed over time 
according to local priorities identified by the population, yet the overarching goal was to improve 
the living conditions of residents in the area, which includes environmental improvements, 
economic development initiatives, and finding land for services (Nour, 2011, pp.82-84). An 
interesting approach of this program was the fact that it used the local governorates as the 
implementing agency instead of the usual NGO lane. This was deliberate in order to create 
“strong municipalities” that advocate for participation and can be flagships for the rest of the 
country. Yet despite its name, both literature (Piffero, 2010) and experts seems to concur that 
community participation was limited to public consultations, and greater focus was on 
strengthening municipalities and being able to navigate the Egyptian bureaucracy. Yet the 
organization developed a great manual for decision-makers that details effective participatory 
approaches that could be used in future programs (GTZ, 2010). 
Ultimately Egyptian informal areas, as Sims (2012) describes them, have many problems 
“but they relate mostly to the lack of sufficient state investments in infrastructure and public 
services to keep up with population growth" (p.270).  Thus it seems that informal systems 
dominate the public space and so recognizing how parallel systems operate is necessary. 
Parallel Systems and Community self-help 
As seen in the case of Cairo and across the Southern hemisphere, a parallel system of informality 
exists and dominates despite the authorities’ blind eye. As such there has been a great trend 
towards community organizations and networks coming together to give “voice” to the residents 
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of the areas. These organizations can be formed on the basis of a variety of commonalities, such 
as savings groups coming together, local CDAs forming a national coalition and even 
international organizations. For example, “in Cambodia, India, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe” urban poor federations are made 
up of hundreds or thousands of savings groups (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.112). A flagship is the 
Alliance of the National Slum Dwellers- Mahila Milan in India, which has “savings cooperatives 
formed by women slum and pavement dwellers” (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.112). It is supported by 
a local NGO that has branches across the nation. All of these networks are characterized by 
being based on community-managed savings and credit groups, which allows them to work 
together, and thus helps them develop other initiatives such as infrastructure upgrading, housing 
etc. (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.115). Thus, the federations help their members carry out projects, and 
the processes and results can be shared with other urban groups in different areas that may be 
encouraged to go down the same path (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.115). What makes these 
organizations effective is the fact that they show the government what the community when it is 
organized can do and thus open up channels for negotiation in policies and practices 
(Satterthwaite, 2005, p.115). Essentially they have created parallel systems to the government, 
proven their success and began the longer process of molding destitute formal systems with their 
successful informal endeavors- thus “overriding governments”.  
At the international level, there are both global and regional networks that have come to 
provide international solidarity with their local partners and pressure international agencies to 
recognize the potential at the local levels. The most renowned of these is Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI), and an example at the regional level is the Asian Coalition for Housing 
Rights (ACHR).SDI in particular with its vast network of partners “supports inter-federation 
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learning, [and] development of representative organizations” (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.116). They 
have even preliminary starts in Egypt where they have established a relationship with CID 
consulting (a development consultant agency) that has put them in contact with a local CDA  in 
Manshiet Nasr that is formed by youth from the rubbish collector community (Zabaleen) (SDI 
website, 2013). Hence, the move towards urban poor-led organizations may be beginning to take 
place in Cairo, yet the sustainable relevance of this international movement to the Egyptian 
context remains to be seen. The following section briefly discusses these ideas. 
Contextual Relevance of Literature 
Going through the literature and practical experiences, redundancy of both concepts and 
examples of programs were very dominating Global academic literature mostly focused on 
dissecting or advocating for and against bottom-up development; recounting and critiquing 
infrastructure upgrading programs, and placing infrastructure within global contexts of 
megacities, the MDGs and informality trends. While on the other hand, reports from donors and 
NGOs were mostly detailing their achievements, presenting independent evaluations, or giving 
worn out recommendations both to solicit future funding and to dictate to government partners. .  
It was thus obvious that little attention has been given to documenting local self-help initiatives 
or other viable solutions by the urban poor themselves. This was true for Egypt, where the focus 
has been mostly on donor interventions, governmental practices, and simply repeating the 
conditions of these informal areas. Additionally, it was  rare to find field research done in areas 
not targeted by donors, such as Izbit ElHaggana and the peri-urban areas of Gizah.  
 However, analyzing the literature was a valuable exercise as it helped to give light to 
different experiences of donors and governments, both successes and failures that can be learned 
from. Community-based initiatives were harder to find, such as the Orangi project, but they are 
40 
 
in fact of most relevance to the study case studies. This is since they give a closer look at how 
communities organize, the limits of their capabilities and resources, inherent social structures, 
interactions with the government, and the future of the project in terms of sustainability. 
 Another noteworthy case study is that of the Egyptian Canal city of Ismailia.  After the 
1973 war, a Master Plan was developed for the urban development of the city that included the 
upgrading of a district called Hai ElSalam, which was a particular success (Khoury, 1996, 
p.199). Following this experience two informal areas, El Hallous and El Bahtini, were selected 
by the governor as sites of upgrading and land tenure with aid from donors (Cities Alliance, 
2004, p.45). What is interesting about these experiences was that the governorate was the driving 
force behind this change as it approached donors to support its plans to upgrade the areas, and 
develop capacities for participatory approaches to be incorporated (Cities Alliance, 2004, p.45). 
The experience has been deemed a success as it has firstly secured tenure for the residents who 
had mostly squatted on vacant land; including residents’ in planning processes; secured a public 
budgetary allocation for the project; and influenced national decision-making processes (Cities 
Alliance, 2004, p.45; Davidson, 2006, pp.7-9). It has also been characterized as a “conscious 
bottom-up process” that although not perfect, integrated the community in “productivity, equity 
and environmental management” (Khoury, 1996). 
As such looking at the lessons learned from government and donor projects, as well as 
the experiences of community-based projects helped shape the case studies. Hence, the following 
sections will aim to fill the void of local experiences by giving another insight into community 
urban management through the case studies of Izbit ElHaggana and the government’s “back 
participation” in these initiatives.  
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Chapter 3- Methodology 
This section will look at the methods employed to carry out a qualitative study in Izbit 
ElHaggana by looking at the basic aim of the research, the design of the case studies, and the 
data collection plan. 
Basic Aim of the Research 
This aim of this study is two-fold. First, the research looks at how local communities take the 
initiative to provide and upgrade local infrastructure in the absence of government services. 
Through two in-depth case studies of self-help schemes in Izbit ElHaggana, the research focused 
on tracing the phases and developing a timeline of how infrastructure is installed and/or 
upgraded in the area. This was done through looking at informal systems and community actors; 
government actors and interventions; and integration into formal systems. The two case studies 
focus on water initiatives. The first is the installation and maintenance of the water piping in the 
last section of ElHaggana where the government has not yet installed piping; and secondly, the 
installation of piping to a Mosque in the third part of ElHaggana as well as 10 homes that 
occurred before government intervention. 
 The second objective of the research is to identify through interviews with local 
government officials and national experts in informal areas, policies and perceptions regarding 
upgrading infrastructure in informal areas around Egypt. These interviews highlight the attitudes 
of the government regarding grassroots participation, effectiveness of legislation and potential 
changes, government orientations and challenges on the ground in tackling structural problems in 
informal areas. 
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 The site selected for the area of study in Izbit ElHaggana, as one of the oldest informal 
areas in Cairo, one of the most populous and also an understudied area in literature. 
Research Design 
Based on an ethnographic approach, in-depth interviews were conducted with three categories of 
stakeholders in the infrastructure paradigm that were part of a purposive sample.  
Community interviews 
The first group of interviews was with different members of the community in Izbit ElHaggana. 
The interviewees were determined in conjunction with the local community development 
association (CDA) “Nur elMashreq”, and the only criterion for selection was that they were 
involved in the planning, implementation and operation of the specific service, or are direct 
beneficiaries of the service. There were 11 interviews done across the two case studies, and 
conscious attempts were made to have a diversified group representing different actors in the 
upgrading process. These include NGO staff responsible for the initiative, community leaders, 
fundraisers, beneficiary families etc. The group that was inaccessible was the labor workers and 
technicians that worked on the piping such as plumbers. There was also an anticipated gender 
bias due to access issues, but in reality the author was given access to four different households, 
and women from the beneficiary families were extremely approachable. The interview guide for 
this category of interviewees was based on the following themes: 
- What and how are community-led efforts implemented in Izbit ElHaggana? 
- How is fundraising handled? 
- Did these self-help schemes push communities to go further develop their conditions? 
- Dynamics of the relationship with local authorities 
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Local government interviews 
The second category of interviews targeted government officials. Two interviews took place with 
an anticipated third that did not come through at the last moment. One of these is a mid-level 
government employee in the utilities sector in the Gizah governorate. The second interview was 
with a senior level government employee in the Cairo governorate, who is also an independent 
urban consultant. Interview guides were loosely-structure and based on the following themes: 
- What are the current government efforts in installing/upgrading infrastructure in informal 
areas in general, and Izbit ElHaggana in particular? 
- How do local governments and utility services react and complement/upgrade 
community-led initiatives? 
- Perspectives on informal systems and participatory upgrading 
- Are joint efforts for future upgrading a policy option?  
Experts in Informality and housing 
The final category of interviews conducted was experts with professional experience in informal 
areas. Two interviews were carried out where the first was an urban planner with over ten years’ 
experience in Gizah governorate in donor-led interventions. The second was with the 
independent expert David Sims who has worked for over 20 years in Egypt both in donor and 
government-led interventions and independently. The main overriding themes covered including 
the following: 
- The dichotomy between community and government efforts in upgrading infrastructure 
- The future of integrated infrastructure upgrading and participatory local governance 
 All these interviews were loosely structured and based on gauging interviewees’ personal 
experiences, expertise on the topic and attitudes towards participatory upgrading schemes. The 
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interviews were all conducted in Cairo with an average time of 30-40 minutes each with some 
interviews reaching two hours. The questions touched upon various themes including lack of 
infrastructure and services in informal areas, informal community systems, performance of the 
local officials, know-how of the local communities, and feasibility of joint efforts. There was no 
particular order for conducting the interviews, and all three categories were interwoven together 
based on the availability of informants. The process began with community informants, and 
government and expert interviews were carried out alternately while the author was conducting 
case study interviews. This meant that both sides were able to comment on the others’ 
performance and activities, which aided in triangulation.  It is necessary to note that community 
leaders had experience in dealing with the government in some cases with over 10 years  and so 
have clear insights into its workings and local relationships, some being current or previous civil 
servants themselves. As such, these interviews, coupled with the relevant literature on global 
experiences in self-help community building, support the framing and construct of the case 
studies section as follows. 
Construct of the Case Studies 
The two case studies constitute the main source of primary information.  Each case study will 
incorporate four main sections as detailed below. 
1. Context Pre-Upgrading Initiatives 
This part will firstly include the temporary facilities used earlier and any neighboring upgrading 
processes; the services in place (government and community) and those lacking; and the 
preliminary steps leading up to the planning of the initiative.  
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2. Planning and organization 
This section will focus on analyzing how the inception of the project came about, by 
whom, and the preliminary steps; initial government reactions; types of planning; levels of 
community participation; fundraising efforts and resources used etc. 
3. Implementation 
The main part of the case study will document the processes of how the 
community/government efforts were carried out; deviations from the original planning; main 
challenges and methods of overcoming them; opponents and supporters; beneficiary inclusion 
and fees; inclusion and exclusion of different community actors; basic accountability and 
governance mechanisms; etc. 
4. Initiative operation and maintenance 
In addition to the case studies looking at the already exerted efforts, this section will also 
look at the current efforts going towards maintaining the structures and their impact. This will 
include whether these installments have in fact been maintained and recognizing those 
responsible; sustainability of community payments and emergence of free riders; replications in 
other areas; inception of new projects; current ownership of the structures; repercussions from 
the government and faces of formalization; complimentary/supplementary government 
interventions; etc. 
Data collection plan 
Other than the available literature on the topics related to informal areas, community-led 
initiatives and water accessibility; a main secondary source that will be consulted is a research 
carried out previously by Dr. Jennifer Bremer and the author in Izbit ElHaggana. This particular 
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research looked at tracing the history of infrastructure interventions and initiatives by the 
community and government in other areas in ElHaggana. A variety of different interviews were 
conducted that included members of the community, CDA employees and government officials.  
 Having prior research experience in the area, the validity of these results will be 
confirmed since all field work will be carried out solely by the author without need of a 
translator. There will however, be some reliability concerns that are further outlined in the 
following “Limitations” section. 
Limitations 
As with any qualitative field work with communities, certain limitations were anticipated to 
occur and were met through recognizing their potential influence on theresults of the study. 
 To begin with, the research used the sole tool of in-depth interviews with different 
societal actors involved in infrastructure interventions in informal areas. This means that there 
was the constant constraint of receiving subjective information from this qualitative method. 
This is since informants would respond as per their interpretation and views concerning the issue 
at hand, and their strong feelings on matters regarding living conditions would cloud any 
objective observations. At the same time, there was also the influence of the great Egyptian 
pastime of informants telling interviewers what they want to hear. This means that there may be 
exaggerated or enhanced expressions of dissatisfaction of government interventions, informants 
giving themselves credit in fighting for a cause, and hiding stories that may differ from the 
adopted scenario a community wishes to correspond to strangers from other areas in Cairo. This 
poses a threat to the reliability of the data; however given AUC’s long-term relationship in the 
area the consistency of the community experience has been the same. 
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 These biases in data gathered from the interviews will also be overcome using 
triangulation techniques. This includes verifying and cross-referencing any data on intervention 
dates and magnitudes with different societal actors that may be providing different stories. For 
example where government officials insisted on the existence of the provision of services, 
realities from the community on the receiving end shed light on the delivery, quality and 
existence of such services. Interviews with the experts also helped in analyzing whether the 
interactions taking place in Izbit ElHaggana correspond to trends in other informal areas of 
Cairo, or have differentiating features. 
 It must be acknowledge however that this study has a limited sample size of respondents 
in the three main categories interviewed. There may also be limits to the diversity of the sample 
due to accessibility issues, as the contact in the local CDA may only be providing access to a 
certain selection of individuals they approve of. Inherent gender and power biases in the 
community may also be reflected in the sample interviewed. As such the research aimed to look 
at perceptions of those taking part in the study, without aiming for a high number of respondents, 
but rather a diversity of experiences. 
Ultimately, it remains to be seen how results of this study can be extrapolated to 
generalize beliefs about informal areas as a whole. On the one hand it is important to note that 
this is only one type of experience and the case studies give a snapshot of one phase of self-help 
project cycles that has a certain form of relationship with the government. Other phases of these 
initiatives could have different approaches in dealing with the government. Also ElHaggana has 
been expressed by many to be a different type of informal area, closer to Manshiet Nasr, as they 
are both squatter areas by creation. In addition, the study is also limited in scope to the eastern 
areas of ElHaggana, whereas the northern areas closer to Suez road may have undoubtedly some 
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commonalities, but may also have unique differing experiences in infrastructure that will need to 
be studied separately. On the other hand, these results can be generalizable to other self-help 
experiences across Cairo, which seem to follow the same logic and networked systems as per 
both government experts’ testimonies. As such the study does not aim to generalize the 
interactions taking place in Izbit ElHaggana as being the norm to other informal areas in Cairo. 
Rather, it aims to complement existing literature by taking this area as a case study and 
illustrating how informal formation, demographics, community initiatives can influence the 
dynamics on the ground. The same can be documented in other areas as well as different sectors.  
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Chapter 4- Description of Data 
This section will look at the research done in Izbit ElHaggana and summarize the experiences of 
the community members. A description of the current status quo of infrastructure is given, a brief 
look at the partner CDA, two case studies of self-help water installations, as well as an insight 
into the electricity and sewage connections of the area. The research used interview guides, 
interviews were mostly taped, and pictures were taken to document the installed structures. 
ElHaggana Today 
Today ElHaggana still lies in the regularization stage but has an uneven distribution of services 
as the government intervention having started around 2003/2004 has not covered all of the 
districts in the area yet (Board of Directors’ (BOD) interviews). As the authorities began their 
engagement in ElHaggana, they began in the Northern area close to the Suez Road, or the kilo 
4.5 as it is commonly known as (Bremer, 2013, p.22). The next closest district was the second 
area of intervention, followed by the third middle district, and the final completely void area that 
juts up right next to the Military sports complex. The first two phases took about 3 to 4 years 
each to complete and the third stage was just started in late 2012 (community leader interview). 
As a result, many residents decided they would not wait for the formal connection, took matters 
in their own hands and developed their own personal connections by tapping into the newly 
install piping (community leader interview). 
 As for other types of services, ElHaggana boasts of just two public schools with 
conditions that are reminiscent of most governmental schools in Egypt, with 60-70 students per 
class, a dependency on private lessons, and inaccessible to residents at the end of the Izba 
(residents’ interviews). Roads within the Izba, even the main Worsha road, are not paved and 
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transportation systems are mostly made up of the intricate network of Tuk Tuks, microbuses, 
pickups and trucks. There are no security forces or police presence within ElHaggana, nor any 
type of governmental institution such as a post office. There is one public health clinic that has 
been reported by residents to simply act as registry for births and deaths, and there are 
continuous medication shortages (residents’ interviews). 
As for the relationship between civil society and informal areas including ElHaggana, usually 
NGOs that are involved in informal areas are charity associations that collect donations for 
clothes, Ramadan bags, and in some cases help residents re-build parts of their houses in these 
areas. However, there is an under-researched area of local Community Development 
Associations that have not been properly documented in many cases. For example in ElHaggana 
alone, the partner CDA claims that are over 35 local organizations serving the community 
(Residents’ interviews). These also continue most faith-based charity activities, but some are also 
involved in traditional economic women’s empowerment, refugee support and literacy programs. 
 The partner CDA for this research, Nur ElMashreq, along with a coalition of other CDAs 
in the area have now realize the potential for their impact on their community and have been 
making progress towards securing land from the military to establish a social services facility 
(BOD interviews). As this research was taking place, the CDA was in continued negotiations 
with the local municipality, the Cairo governorate, the utility companies and the military all at 
once (BOD interviews). 
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Nur ElMashreq CDA 
As previously mentioned, the Nur ElMashreq CDA was the point of reference in ElHaggana to 
study community projects and understand their social workings. AUC had previously 
collaborated with the CDA in charitable activities and in supporting its endeavors to set up a 
social services complex (Bremer, 2013, p.12). The CDA (established in 2008) is based in the 
eastern areas of ElHaggana and has access to a large area of residents (Annex 4). It is also a 
typical Islamic cooperative that is registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and whose 
board members have lived in ElHaggana from its early beginnings (Bremer, 2013). 
Nur ElMashreq was also a desirable selection as it had conducted several community 
water projects, and its staff was involved in previous projects with other CDAs as well. The first 
case study describes the installation of self-help piping in an area where topography reduces 
access to services; and the second looks at how a small self-help installation was complemented 
by the formal connection. This selection was based on the availability of information, and 
choosing to select two inherently different projects. Another case study of a larger water project 
that reached 5000 families was documented in Bremer, 2013.  
Case Study 1- Defying Nature 
In 2008, the USAID Housing Study for Greater Cairo stated that “only 1.3 per cent of 
households had no access to running water” (Sims, 2012, p.325). Although this is an estimate, 
however it seems as though ElHaggana provides an exception to the general rule of service 
provision in informal areas. This particular case study will look at the fourth district in the 
government’s plan to connect to water supplies. Nine interviews were held, two with board 
members of Nur ElMashreq one of which lives in this area, one male and four female 
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beneficiaries of the gehood zateya project, and two male youth
1
.  Also the author was able to 
visit four households that are connected to this water piping. 
Pre-Connection Description 
As the government began to install infrastructure in ElHaggana, the informal area itself was still 
growing. The authorities divided their task into four districts, with the last district being of the 
largest area whose topology is the most rugged. The area has both very high and low points and 
the authorities had advised residents not to settle there. However, land was still being sold and 
people looking for affordable housing would not question the suitability of the land. As with 
most people in ElHaggana, they would settle first and then figure out later how to service their 
needs. This is reflected in the study conceptual framework Figure 2 illustrating the processes of 
how community efforts form informal areas first then bring in services later on. On the 
government side, as such infrastructure was being installed throughout the Izba, no matter how 
slowly, electricity and sewerage were the first to arrive in district 4. However, some areas were 
rejected as being too low to install sewage systems and were disregarded in the plans. As for the 
water company, district 4 was supposed to start right after the third district, which got its share 
late in 2012. However, again the authorities when brought it insisted that they would not be able 
to navigate the system throughout the hilly terrain, and so left the residents to fend for 
themselves. This included buying water from water trucks and using a public standpipe installed 
in one of the lower areas of the district (community leader interview). 
  At the same time, residents were aware of the neighboring districts' efforts in installing 
self-help structures. The experience of the “Faddiya (Silver) Cooperative” (FC) was particularly 
relevant. As outlined in Bremer (2013), the FC installed a network of self-help piping in one part 
                                                 
1 Names have been changed for anonymity and confidentiality. 
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of the second and third districts of ElHaggana, connecting from a water source designated for 
formal areas but left open for residents to tap into (p.25). The project served 500-600 houses 
until official water systems came in to complement the water supply (Bremer, 2013, p.25). 
Hence, one of the residents of the fourth district and a Board of Directors (BOD) member in Nur 
ElMashreq saw the opportunity to tap into this pipe line for his street as well. Receiving the 
permission from the “owners,” he began plans to tap into this piping. 
Planning and Organization 
Having previously been part of other gehood zateya initiatives, the main community organizer in 
contact with the FC “owners” held a meeting with trusted community members for each street in 
the proximity of his street. A brief profile of the community is given in Figure 3. They decided 
that each street would collect money for themselves to install the piping and the individual 
household connections. The pipes themselves were “left behind” by the local contractors who 
were meant to install the official systems in the district. These were “taken over” by the CDA 
and given to the fourth district residents to use as they see fit. This again is a reflection of the 
government’s “indirect aid” actions as presented in Figure 2 that support their ambiguous 
acknowledgement.  Hence, the community organizer began the task of mobilizing his own street 
to figure out who wanted to be included in the initiative, and it is of no surprise that everyone 
wanted to pay a one-time fee instead of having to continuously buy water from trucks 
(community organizer interview). The total amount needed for each street was about 1050LE, 
but residents who could not pay the service fee of about 20LE would be covered by other 
residents willing to chip in (Bremer, 2013, p.27; community organizer interview). The amount 
collected was then given to a middleman responsible for contracting the laborers involved in the 
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process. This was usually a local contractor involved in other self-help structures, and he usually 
hired people from the Izba itself (community organizer interview). 
Initiative Implementation 
Due to the hilly nature of the area, including and the community organizer’s personal street, the 
self-help structure took approximately a month to be installed. The sub-main piping going 
through the street was a 4-inch asbestos pipe, and each individual household connection was a ½ 
inch pipe. The laborers involved in this process included the diggers (who charged 5LE per 
meter dug), the plumbers (usual daily rate is 50/60LE), others who had the task of backfilling the 
trench and others. These were all paid from the 1050LE collected per street. The “middleman” 
would usually reach some sort of agreement with the laborers so that they would work on most 
of the streets requiring the self-help structures (beneficiaries’ interviews).  
 Individual household connections were bought by each house separately, and usually cost 
from 20-30LE or more, depending on the distance from the sub-main and the laborers involved 
(beneficiary interview). One can juxtapose this figure with numbers from government 
implemented connections that can range in thousands of pounds. 
 In addition, as streets began to get water, other streets also became interested in tapping 
into the line. As such, having seen the experience of the first few streets, more residents began to 
bring their own pipes and connect to the line. The community organizer estimated that about 500 
additional families were benefiting from the FC connection in the fourth district, where 6 
families live in each building (community organizer interview). 
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Initiative Operation and Maintenance 
Having installed the structures, the community’s role is minimalized. In order to guarantee 
maintenance, the community appoints a local “faucet controller” (Bremer, 2013, p.28). He is 
responsible for both controlling the flow of water, deciding which street will get higher pressure, 
as well as maintenance of the line. He is paid by each household 10LE per month for his 
services. In case of any damages or repairs, he can also collect money from the households to 
pay for the spare parts and to contract laborers to do the work. 
 Nonetheless, it is unfortunate for this area that they are at “the end of the line” and so 
their water pressure is generally very low. They are usually able to get water during winter, 
however it barely exists during the summer, and so they resort back to buying water from local 
truck providers. With the advances in technology, now housewives can simply call up the truck 
driver and have him deliver water right up to her front door (beneficiary interview). In the case 
of the community organizer, he installed a water tank (equal to about four barrels) costing 50LE 
in order to continue to store water. 
 In both cases, whether water is used from the self-help piping or barrels, the quality of 
water is appalling. The tendency to install water filters has appeared to be a given in the area, due 
to the frequency of leakages and breaks in the piping. Since most of the area also has sewage 
systems that are unlikely to be maintained by the authorities, the chances of contamination are 
very high.  
 What is noteworthy about this district is that they are actively engaging with the 
government through various means. This includes writing complaints to the municipalities, 
paying bribes for municipal engineers to come and inspect the areas contested, and even staging 
a road sit-in. In the summer of 2012, the mosques of the area called for people to go to a nearby 
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Figure 3 Community Organizer Profile 
Wael came to ElHaggana from Beheyra in the 1990s where he first rented an apartment, then 
sold his family’s gold and bought land here. He witnessed the beginnings of services where 
electricity came from a nail on a wooden plaque operated by a local provider, and water was 
sold by the military. Today Wael lives in the fourth district where the formal water systems 
have not yet been installed. He was the point of reference for his street when installing the 
self-help piping connecting to an informal network. He claims they are able to get water in 
winter, but in summer they still have to buy barrels and store it in water tanks. He was also 
forced to install a water filter as the quality of water is contestable due to leakages. He took 
part in a road sit-in in 2012, and when the authorities responded they simply sent them more 
water trucks. He notices water is available at the borders of the Izba but not inside it. For 
instance the military sports complex, a few meters close by,  
“gaboolo maya li had ando” (they brought water right to the complex’s doors  
(but not for us)). 
main road and stay there until the authorities took notice. According to the community organizer 
there may have been thousands of residents showing up. The Chief of municipality came to the 
sit-in and promised to solve both the sewage and water problem; however, he only sent water 
trucks the following week as a temporary measure and did not follow up afterwards. Thus they 
employ “sedatives” on the residents (community organizer interview). 
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Case study 2- The Mosque that saved us 
This case study looks at water piping serving a Mosque and 10 other houses in the vicinity. 
Interviews with a member of the CDA’s BOD were completed, as well as interviews with two 
beneficiaries from the 10 houses connected to the piping (one male, one female). Attempts were 
made to contact the plumber and “faucet controller” but they were unavailable. 
Pre-Connection Description 
After the establishment of the Nur ElMashreq CDA, one of the founding members also 
established the Ali Ibn Abi Taleb Mosque in part of the building. He was given a decree by the 
governor that water should be connected to the Mosque and in turn the CDA, however this did 
not materialize (BOD interview). As seen in Annex 3, both the CDA and the Mosque lie in the 
eastern edge of ElHaggana and are located in the third area designated by the water authorities to 
have piping installed. However, the CDA member, having already had the experience of the 
previous water project, decided to install his own piping to the Mosque in the end months of 
2011. He began to dig from the location of the Mosque in the neighboring street (to the South) to 
see if he could tap into the already installed FC piping. However, the neighbors actually stopped 
him and would not allow him to tap into the piping as they feared it would decrease their water 
pressure and reduce the amount of water they received. He repeated the same process in the 
street on the northern side, and once again he was shunned by the neighbors. As this began to be 
costly for him, twice paying for digging, he began to solicit the help of others in the street and 
finally reached 10 other households that lacked water and could not wait for the government 
piping to come in. As such they agreed to collaborate and pay to bring in self-help piping to 
fulfill their water needs (BOD interview, beneficiary interview).  
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Planning and Organization 
Having previously been part of other gehood zateya initiatives, the BOD member assumed the 
lead role in organization. He worked first to mobilize those that were interested in being part of 
the self-help system. Some families rejected to join the collaboration and finally 10 households 
in the same street participated. Two beneficiary profiles are given in Figure 5 and Figure 4. A 
collaborative planning process ensued where the male heads of households came together to 
figure out the cost of the project. They figured in the costs of the piping, the labor, bribes, and 
maintenance. As such the set user fee was 300LE, payable one time and included the sub-main 
piping, worker fees, digging, plumbing etc. It would not include household connections as these 
will be relative depending on the location of the sub-main pipe. The planners took about a month 
to get the materials prepared, contract the laborers and collect the required funding. Four main 
organizers were involved in the planning, but the CDA BOD member assumed the role of 
collecting the funds. 
Initiative Implementation 
The duration of the initiative was one week to install the piping and tap into the government 
supply from the second phase that has already been installed. The sub-main piping was about 
150 meters long from the water source to the street of the Mosque, and the 10 houses were along 
this route. However, the organizers maintained in front of the surrounding community that the 
piping was aimed for the Mosque, which allowed others to be more sympathetic to allowing the 
piping to go through their streets (beneficiary interview). 
 Two types of piping were used- 4 inch asbestos pipe for the sub-main piping and half an 
inch for the individual pipes. The pipes were installed one meter into the ground and the 
organizer admits they are of medium quality. They could have picked the pipes that were similar 
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to the government official systems (having asked local contractors) however; it would result in 
increased costs they could not afford. There were a total of 8 laborers taking part in the digging, 
three plumbers and a diversity of assistants (BOD interview). Although, those mostly involved 
were the workers, but the household owners also alternatively supervised the processes and “got 
their hands dirty” as well. One of the beneficiaries mentioned that he and three others took turns 
supervising (beneficiary interview). The individual connections were paid for by each household 
and usually ranged between 20-30LE depending on the distance.  
 Also as the project was taking place, some neighbors that had originally rejected being 
part of the project changed their minds and wanted to be part of the collaboration. However, the 
planners decided against including them since they believed that this would distort the financial 
calculations they had already done, they only bought piping for the original capacity of ten 
households, and the additional users would reduce their water supply (BOD interview). 
 In addition, the main community organizer held on to the receipts of the project and made 
them available for any beneficiaries to look at (BOD interview). 
Initiative Operation and Maintenance 
Concerning maintenance, the ten households came together to employ a man that would have the 
job of controlling the water supply to the self-help piping from the tapped-into water source. 
Each household pays him a salary of 3-5LE per month and he is responsible for the maintenance 
and any damages to the piping. Usually he pays for any repairs from the money he receives, but 
if the damage is great he will go around and collect money to fund the repairs that he himself 
decides on (BOD and beneficiary interviews). There is no method of supervising his efforts, but 
the users can call him if they face any difficulties. 
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 After the installation of this system, the government finally brought in the official water 
systems last Ramadan (August 2012) and installed 6 inch piping (beneficiary interview). 
Residents were required to install their own personal connections to these pipes, which cost 
about 20-30LE each (beneficiary interview). As the governmental contractor was busy installing 
the official piping, the residents of the street would point out to the laborers where their self-help 
piping is so that they could avoid it, and when they dug they would simply install theirs next to 
what was already in place (BOD interview). Both the residents and the government did not want 
to remove the self-help piping, as for the latter as it will be too costly; and for the former it 
provides extra water security as an alternative if water shortages occur (BOD interview). The 
interviewees all referred to the self-help piping as “our line”. Hence there seems to be a sense of 
co-ownership of the structure, although they all gave credit to the Mosque for giving them the 
opportunity to connect to water (beneficiary interview).   
Nonetheless, even with the officially installed structures and the residents putting in their 
own personal connections, they still do not want to take the step towards regularization. This is 
since they learned from others’ horror stories in the area of the water company charging fees for 
previous years, for water supply to stories that were built at a later time, and for water that may 
not even come regularly (beneficiary interview). This is reflected in the conceptual framework’s 
Figure 2 governmental action in rejecting informal areas through creating difficulties in 
formalization. As such, for the time being living on water coming in from both pipes satisfies the 
needs of these households as they feel they have paid their dues in installing their own 
connections and self-help structures; while continuing to pay for low water quality and shortages.  
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  Figure 5 Beneficiary Profile A 
Moving to ElHaggana in 2004, Gerges* had hopes to build a house that would bring his whole 
family together and provide apartments for his children as they grow older. Coming from Minya, 
Gerges bought the house as one floor “beit suezi” and has added floors whenever he could finance 
them. He works as a stonemason and contracts others to work for him. He even worked for a time at 
AUC on the new campus facilities. He has five children, whom he did not bring with him to 
ElHaggana until he connected water to his house. He took part in the Mosque piping and exerted 
personal effort with the workers to make sure the connections were properly installed. He hopes to 
regularize and install a water meter; however, he is afraid he would be billed for the consumption of 
the previous owner.   
He believes “elhekooma rahet aleiha wa amalna fi Rabena” (the government is irrelevant and 
our faith is in God) 
Figure 4 Beneficiary Profile B 
Om Shady* has been living in ElHaggana for over 20 years, having moved from Ain Shams when she 
married. She remembers the early days when they would buy water from the trucks for 3/4LE a barrel, 
and would have to run after them in summer to beg for a share. Today she is glad she paid the one 
payment of 300LE to be able to tap into the Mosque’s piping, although the water still continues to cut off 
at times. She does want to “nemshi osool” (go by the book) and applied for the electric meter that was 
installed, whereas for her the cost of a water meter is too high (1100LE). She is a working mother, 
carrying two jobs in a public hospital and a clinic in order to put her children through school. One of her 
daughters is the first to enter a higher education institute, but she forced her younger son to drop out of 
school to pay the bills. She repeats that she feels that she has wronged him “zalamtoh”. Her husband 
does not contribute to the household. 
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Further Infrastructure Insights 
Electricity Connections 
It is very rare to hear residents actually praising government services, and it is near impossible to 
hear it from residents in informal areas. Surprisingly however, all the community residents in the 
areas studied spoke highly of the Electric Company and its operations. For example all the 
residents interviewed had electrical connections, meters and were receiving acceptable bills. 
They themselves know the electric inspector quite well as he has been serving them for at least 
five years, and he has no problems entering the area; whereas a water inspector is fearful of 
coming into ElHaggana because of the community backlash (residents’ interviews). 
Electricity initially came into the Izba around 2000, give or take a couple of years 
(Bremer, 2013, p.21), and as Sims (2012) describes residents can immediately apply for a 
connection and the distribution company comes in to install it 10 days later (p.262). Any 
increased number of floors and higher voltage is also fairly easy to update. However, residents 
did mention that in the new system of installation, they basically have to pay for everything 
including the meter, cables, internal wiring, and the junction boxes (residents’ interviews). They 
however have no issues with this investment as they view it as a step to formalization. 
 Nevertheless, two areas area in ElHaggana continue to lack electric connections. The first 
of these is an area within the second district designated by the water authorities (north-western). 
This area is paradoxically “the zone below the major high tension lines that pass through the 
Izba, carrying power to New Cairo” (Bremer, 2013, p.21). Since it is illegal to build under these 
lines and given that it is in an informal area, the electricity company refused  to connect them to 
the lines, and subsequently residents in the area use the mosque as a “local distribution point” 
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(Bremer, 2013, p.22). Again the residents used the mosque as a shield to get services from the 
authorities, but obviously illegally. 
 The second area is within the fourth designated area that is the furthest south of the Izba 
and closest to the military sports complex. Since some of the houses in this area are fairly new, 
they were not around during the first coverage of the electricity companies. Although they have 
applied for installation, in the meantime they tap into the sports complex’s wiring and run lines 
between houses to light a couple of hours in the evening (residents’ interviews). The interplay of 
all these entities has been mapped out in the stakeholders’ paradigm in Figure 1. 
Sewage Systems- Future Predicament 
Concerning sewage systems in the Izba, this poses the greatest problem today in particular in the 
fourth district that is closest to the military sports complex. As previously mentioned, in the early 
days residents installed their own septic tanks that served as their personal waste management 
systems. Formal sewage systems were installed (by the Greater Cairo Sanitary Drainage 
Company) in the Izba nearly at the same time as the water systems, yet they were only installed 
as main and sub-main piping in the main side roads of the different areas (residents’ interviews). 
This meant that residents had to buy their own house connections and hire a plumber to connect 
this to the main sewage system (residents’ interviews). This coincides with Sims (2012) own 
experiences where he documented neighbors coming together to install “their own local sewage 
collectors, inspection chambers and house connections” (p.308). Yet this directly resulted in 
many blockages and severe sewage overflows that could contaminate water sources as well 
(Sims, 2012, p.308; interview). 
Yet in the fourth area of ElHaggana, residents do not even have the option to tap into a 
sewage line, since the company refused to install piping because of the hilly nature of the area 
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(residents’ interviews). As such the residents continue to use septic tanks that they keep in 
jammed corners under their building’s stairs, and are constantly harassed by neighbors when they 
need to get rid of the waste (household visits, residents’ interviews).  
Further researching how residents install sewage systems through gehood zateya could be 
especially interesting, as these systems may have an even higher level of community investment 
than water projects.  
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Chapter 5- Analysis and Discussion 
Based on the previous case studies of on the ground experiences from an informal area, this 
section will tackle the different themes that emerged from the residents’ interviews and 
household visits. Apart from the local community, four governmental and expert interviews were 
done and their relevant perspectives will be included in this section as well.  Three main 
categories have been recognized- dissecting self-help initiatives, insights into the social 
structures of informal areas, and interactions with the government. Gehood Zateya in informal 
areas across Cairo will also be tackled in a final section. 
Gehood zateya Processes 
It has been recognized all across the literature that informal communities devise methods for 
self-provision that are both “ingenious but illegal” (Sims, 2012, p.94). This sub-section will look 
at the characteristics of gehood zateya processes as seen in the case studies and how self-help 
initiatives were actually implemented in this particular informal area. The main characteristics to 
be discussed are incremental networking build-up, innovation, self-sufficiency, sub-optimal 
quality and sustainability. 
Incremental Networking Build-Up  
Just walking through the unpaved streets of ElHaggana with a member of the CDA pointing out 
the  different self-help water systems is enough to make one realize how much has been achieved 
over time. Although it is difficult to date back the first actual self-help structure, yet what is clear 
is that once a certain number of streets have been connected, there is a domino effect on the rest 
of the area. As seen with the FC’s piping in the second and third districts, there was an 
immediate follow-up in the fourth district as soon as mobilization occurred. As such, this gradual 
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build-up of networks is the basis of the service provision in the area, which is substantially faster 
than government interventions. As indicated by a government official, almost 30-40% of 
informal areas have no formal networking (interview). As such, although residents may narrowly 
think they are serving themselves in a time-based initiative, with time they are actually part of a 
whole system networking process.  
Innovation as a Survival Strategy 
A remarkable feature of these initiatives is the fact that they take a complete lack of services and 
overcome it to establish areas that are in one way or another covering their every need. This is a 
strategy that many of them have ingrained both from their village days and from living in other 
informal areas. It is noticeable that solutions such as septic tanks are actually taken from village 
traditions and tactics of survival (Sims interview). Most of these innovations mostly depended on 
a person first taking initiative to fill the vacuum of services, starting with the informal providers 
looking to make a profit, to the natural leaders that decide they want their “own” solutions and 
do not want to be passive consumers. Using the Mosque as a shield to hide behind for bringing in 
piping or as a local point for running electricity wires is an example. 
 An interesting debate that came up in both interviews with the community and experts is 
whether their innovation strategies are not just camouflaged stealing tactics. In fact what is the 
difference between gehood zateya initiatives and stealing public services? The residents usually 
made the distinction between electricity and water/sewage, where the former is regarded as 
illegal, but the second as actually providing the government with a service and saving it 
resources. The reasoning behind this is probably due to the global rationale of water being a right 
that citizens should have regardless of any other implications. However, citizens do overlook the 
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fact that this water has to be both treated and pumped to reach urban areas, which is a very costly 
process that only governments and private contractors can shoulder the burden. 
Communal Networks and Self-sufficiency  
A common phrase that was repeated throughout the residents’ interviews was “we will just do it 
ourselves”. This heightened feeling of self-dependency is particularly rampant in informal areas 
where residents have either no access to the formal systems, or prefer to avoid the hassle of 
regularization and the labyrinth of governmental processes. This independence was visible in 
both the organization of the community as well as the financial resources invested.  
  One of the main characteristics that have been often repeated about informal areas is the 
intricate webs of communal networks they thrive on them. With the large population of Upper 
Egyptians, especially from Minya, coming in and bringing their extended families, they brought 
with them “established mechanisms for collaboration in communal tasks” (Bremer, 2013, p.17). 
As such tasks were easily divided, communities felt real kinship in their streets and also co-
ownership over any self-help structures established. They rarely required help from outsiders, 
and even in their everyday language they refer to other parts of Cairo as “down there” taht fel 
balad.  
Additionally, the financial investments in gehood zateya initiatives have yet to be 
quantified in the literature of any informal area in Egypt. Merely talking to the residents shows 
how they figure into their budgets user fees, maintenance costs etc. and make it a routine 
expenditure. These investments are seen as if they are paying for governmental services, but 
instead they have actual control over them. Residents on numerous occasions insisted that they 
have no problem paying for the services regardless of the provider, as long as they are 
guaranteed quality and supply sustainability; and even without them they would still pay. In 
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reality, residents are not paying for both water and purchase energy that is subsidized and so may 
not realize the full price they would have to pay for these services.  
“Sub-optimal” Quality 
Although accessibility can be solved by simply installing self-help structures, yet the major 
challenge faced is the quality of the water as well as its supply. Both experts and government 
officials have condemned these structures as being the sources of the leakages and overflows 
found today in many informal areas, calling for their removal and replacement (Sims, 2012, 
p.305). One Gizah government official in an urban forum went as far as saying that citizens 
should in no way be involved in infrastructure activities and leave it up to the government. Their 
reasoning stems from the fact that usually the structures “lack both of technical supervision and 
sufficient funding (Sims, 2012, p.305). In addition, there is a strong government responsibility 
for public health as dealing with sub-optimal quality results in long-term health issues that will 
again fall back on to the government’s shoulders at a later point. 
Community leaders also admitted to this during the interviews as they could not afford to 
buy piping that is compatible with the government’s specifications. They were able to talk to 
technical contractors and plumbers working on governmental projects, and so receive 
information on what would be the best quality, but they simply cannot afford the costs. This is 
why they simply ask the same advisors about second best quality and try to get as close as 
possible every time.  In all cases the government actually leaves these secondary lines in the 
ground when they bring in their formal systems, and their contractors do not even do the 
individual household connections they are usually contracted to provide as part of their scope of 
work. 
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Sustainability 
Regarding sustainability, these self-help structures actually endure much longer than one would 
think. The FC network served two whole districts of ElHaggana until the authorities brought in 
the official systems in 2012, a period of at least eight years. The fourth district continues to rely 
on this water source, and the 10 houses next to the Mosque alternate between the official and 
Mosque line, depending on the water supply. The community residents feel that they need these 
structures as security in case of the breakdown of governmental services, which they expect. 
 It is true that the self-help structures in ElHaggana are fairly new compared to areas like 
Gizah for example, and so it may be still early to clarify their sustainability. However, experts 
and government officials are already seeing the leakages and breaks in these self-installed 
structures across informal areas in Cairo, and the ensuing dire consequences of contamination.  
Informal Social Structures 
Another set of themes that emerged from this research are related to the inherent social structures 
of informal areas including natural leaders and the individualism-social cohesion dichotomy. 
Natural leaders and Community Mobilization 
When talking to one of the community organizers for the initiatives and asking why he took on 
this role, his simple answer was that someone needs to take the initiative to get the ball rolling, if 
no-one does that then there will be no water and no improvements (community organizer 
interview). It was obvious during this research that those involved in heading the CDA were the 
natural leaders of the community, whether because of their knowledge of public institutions, 
being an Imam of a Mosque, their long-term residence (over 30 years in several cases) or just 
simply being interested in root development of the area. Three of the board members of the CDA 
were the street collectors of the funds that would go towards the self-help structures, and they 
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understood that they had to rally the whole street behind a cause in order for the projects to work. 
They insisted that their neighbors needed people to trust as they were so used to broken promises 
by the government and so they worked on achieving tangible results. As such their work over 
time creates a web of community reliance that would include different sectors of society at 
different times. 
 In addition, the concepts of community mobilization and organizing appear to be 
organically inherent in the social processes in Izbit ElHaggana and possibly in other informal 
areas. Whether mobilizations occurred during times of political elections, or as pressure tactics 
used by the locals against the government, leaders boasted of being able to gather hundreds of 
people at a time, especially when an issue affects their well-being, service provision being high 
on that list. 
Social cohesion vs. Individualism 
In spite of the community solidarity that is evident all throughout the self-help processes, 
evidence was also seen of individualism and personal interests that play a strong role in informal 
spheres. Sims (2012) points out that there are existing individualist natures, which can be 
identified in the exploitation of communities’ hardships and lack of government interventions. 
For example residents would tell stories of local monopolies of water services where a local in a 
different district would be controlling the water trucks that residents in their district buy from. 
This individual would also try to stop any type of regularization efforts that were exerted by local 
CDAs to bring in the formal water systems. Since he is profiting from the situation as is, he 
actually stopped a project of public standpipes to be brought into the Izba so that residents would 
continue to buy his water. This concept of ‘profiteering from the status quo’ is rampant in 
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literature and especially in donor interventions where they face challenges from different sectors 
as they attempt to install formal systems. 
 Another form of individualism that was first brought to light by an interviewed 
government official is the fact that residents do not necessarily get along if their personal 
interests in their self-help structures are threatened. In many cases in Gizah for example, there 
would be fights among residents on where to install self-help structures to ensure that it would 
not impact the supply of another such structure down the road. This was manifested in the 
Mosque case study where two sets of residents refused to allow the community organizer access 
to their pipes, for fear of decreased water supply; even though they knew that the area to be 
served had none.  
Government-Community Interactions 
Dissecting the interaction between the informal community and the authorities is a major theme 
of this research. Contrary to many beliefs, it is important to note that government intervention in 
informal areas is in fact quite high, which means they are not avoiding engagement in 
informality.  The 2006 Census actually recorded near universal water and sewage connections, 
and as Sims points out there seems to be an “organic development operation […] through local 
and national sectorial agencies" (Sims, 2012, p.131). This sub-section will look at this two-way 
relationship that occurred as mentioned before in only one stage of the self-help project’s life 
cycle that only constitutes as part of the story. A few years ahead may completely change the 
following insights into the dynamic government-community relationship. 
Governmental Perspectives 
As previously illustrated in the conceptual framework Figure 2, the government seems to be 
acting on a dual mindset when it comes to informal areas. Having begun to emerge from denial 
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of these areas in the late 1970s, the government faced the situation where they had to deal with 
already built-up communities and accept their existence. However, this did not occur readily but 
instead manifested in facets of resistance or incomplete and indirect recognition. This could be 
resultant of the fact that the government was involved in an unknown territory of “back 
participation” where it is uncharted who participates in whose decisions, and “which” 
government was involved. The following attempts to link in the government officials’ 
perspectives on these swinging attitudes. 
 To begin with, the government continues to display an ambiguous representation of 
recognition of informal areas. Although the IDSF was established to classify and identify 
informal areas, its mandate initially was limited to just the unsafe areas that do not constitute the 
majority of informality. Thus at the national level, institutions seem to be hedging behind official 
recognition of these areas. On the other hand, local municipalities and governorates all partake in 
the “murky world of collusion between investors, lawyers, fix-it men and local officials” (Sims, 
2012, p.280). They turn a blind eye (and an open hand) to illegal construction, receive bribes to 
reduce reporting and arrests, and in some areas even help out the local residents by leaving 
behind material that can be used for infrastructure. This was the case for the piping used in the 
fourth district that was left behind by the municipality. As such this “laissez-faire” attitude is 
evident in their interactions with the communities, who insist that the “government sees 
everything”; and thus have allowed the seeping in of informality to become the norm, replacing 
the official systems they do not enforce. 
 Yet while the authorities in many cases do “informally” help the growth of these areas, 
there are also strident facets of resistance that complicate the lives of the residents. For example, 
in the case of the water company, they encouraged citizens to regularize their stance and apply 
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for meters, which the residents were glad to do. However, the billing began even before the 
formal water systems came in; no meters were installed and very large back bills were issued to 
long-term residents, as a means for the company to recuperate what was being tapped into by the 
self-help structures (Bremer, 2013, p.23). Since there is no actual method for calculating 
consumption, a government official pointed out that the citizens are being asked to pay according 
to their location and their status quo as informal areas (government official interview).  
 However, as we trace these different faces of the government, it is also important to look 
at the powers and resources these entities actually possess. Residents reported that the 
municipality has no say in whether infrastructure should be installed in these areas or not, and 
they constantly have to wait for a decree by either the Prime Minister or the governor. Even 
when this decree exists, it does not necessarily mean that the resources exist for implementation. 
For example, to install water piping the municipality has to coordinate with the governorate, 
which goes back to the Ministry of Housing and utilities, which pushes the Executive 
Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage Projects (CAPW) to begin the tendering 
process, which then hands over the project to the Greater Cairo Water Supply Company. The 
mere number of these institutions complicates the lines of responsibility and accountability that 
citizens will most certainly not be able to follow.  
 At the same time, especially with today’s state of affairs, the government is in fact 
strapped for financial resources. The government official interviewed pointed out that the Water 
Holding companies are in fact losing money and are not even covering operating costs from 
revenues. As such, the current strategy is to go into areas that are underserved and do not have 
any types of services, and avoid any upgrading projects that will surely increase the losses of 
public entities. 
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Community Perspectives – “What are we?” 
Apart from the electricity company, all the residents had similar attitudes towards the 
government in general. They believed that it simply did not solve anything, and their efforts in 
self-help structures only provide temporary solutions, but do not tackle root causes. They see the 
government as accepting their efforts since they do not stop them, and it is a tactic to solve 
problems that give the government headaches without being involved. However, afterwards they 
come back to the community and expect them to pay for what they have installed and use from 
the water sources, which the community sees as “double profiting” from the community’s 
investment (community organizer interview). 
When asked whether the community would consider including the government somehow 
into their informal systems, assuming the government actually wants to, the residents interjected 
that they are trying to move as far away as possible from the “bureaucracy of decision-making” 
they are subject to whenever they deal with the authorities. To them the governmental maze 
takes time and useful efforts away from the implementation of the project, and so they prefer to 
wait for the government to interject when it wants to. As such, they prefer not to go through any 
forms of regularization from the beginning in order to sustain flexibility and rapidity of decision-
making. 
 There is also a large debate going on in the community regarding regularization and 
moving into formality. The general sentiment is that everyone wants to regularize (community 
organizer interview). The reasoning for this differs but mostly it is because it will finally give the 
residents peace of mind from reporting and arrests, and also give them the opportunity to know 
“who they are”. This is since the community is in a limbo as to how they are qualified by the 
authorities, as officials continue to go back and forth between their nomenclature, which impacts 
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their policies towards the area. For example, when residents first complained about the lack of 
services they were told they were “ashwaeya” (random, a negative term for slums) and so had 
no rights under the law as they were illegally there. After the decree from the Cairo governor to 
install infrastructure for all buildings, they went back believing they were now on the map, but 
were told that they have now become a “mante’et tatweer” (area for improvement) and only 
unsafe areas were a priority. Added to this, the unstable political climate caused officials to be 
wary when making decisions, and personnel changes caused the community to continuously 
restart lobbying processes even though they just need a signature or two to get things done 
“garet alam wa tekhlas” (a pen’s inscription will end it). Also, when the community turned to 
new political actors including the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), they were still stuck in 
conversations about land theft and tenure that may be irrelevant to their infrastructure concerns.  
 On the other hand, utilities’ formalization seems to be a completely different issue. 
Although again residents insisted that they would do anything to receive the service, most of the 
beneficiaries were resistant to going to the water company. A mixture of mistrust and desire to 
avoid public bureaucracy back charges were given as some of the reasons for this resistance. 
This is because residents learned from each other how the government wants to hold them 
accountable for all the years they have been depending on their self-help structures or “stealing”. 
Hence, with no transparent method of calculating water consumption, authorities have been 
issuing residents bills, as part of an installment plan, that go up to thousands of pounds (Bremer, 
2013, p.23) and thus discouraging others from applying. This was not the case with the 
electricity company which developed an affordable installment plan for each resident and they 
have no problems paying back the amounts that are clear and identified. Hence the residents do 
understand that there will always be a degree of corruption involved, but if the process is fair and 
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transparent to a great degree they will have no issues in formalization, apart from anticipated 
financial constraints.  
 At the same time, what was interesting to note is the inherent sense of dependency that 
the community still has for the government despite their self-sufficiency. They continue to 
expect the government to take responsibility for their well-being, even if they defy their advice 
on where to build and how. An example of this related to the residents of the fourth district that 
despite repeated warnings, still built their houses on hilly terrain and now expect the government 
to provide. Their own sense of responsibility was not brought up by any of them. 
 As such they continue to hound the government in different forms and as a resident put it 
“we beg the government for dialogue” (beneficiary interview). Even the youth are engaged in 
these lobbying efforts writing and submitting complaints, attending any and all public forums, 
coordinating with local stakeholders such as the military-managed sports complex, to even save 
the government the trouble of developing solutions.  However they are caught in the trap 
between multiple institutions and overlapping mandates. 
Gehood Zateya in Cairo 
Consequently, through the analysis of the main themes emerging from the case studies, there are 
several threads that can be picked up that shed light on how ElHaggana relates to other informal 
areas in Cairo. To begin with, it is always essential to recognize that this area was formed 
through the squatter activities of both rural and urban migration to the desert land held by the 
military. Yet as per the interviews with both the government and expert officials, who brought in 
stories of experiences in other Cairene informal areas, the self-help strategies employed in 
ElHaggana seem to bear the same characteristics as these urban areas. Although obviously the 
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actors are different, with ElHaggana having the added layer of military interactions; yet, they 
seem to share the same driving forces and take initiative to fill the state vacuum of services. As 
mentioned by the government official, in some areas in Gizah there are streets that have even 3 
to 4 water piping installed through self-help initiatives to strengthen their water supplies. Thus, 
the prevalence of gehood zateya is clearly commonplace, and due to low documentation and 
detailed case studies, it will be difficult to assess if ElHaggana reflects the usual stereotype of 
community organization in infrastructure upgrading. With greater documentation, experience 
exchange can occur and these informal areas can move towards consolidating and formalizing. 
As such, it is essential that the opening up of two-way communication channels takes 
place, through which other areas can learn from ElHaggana, and the latter can also avoid falling 
into the traps other communities find themselves in today. Concerning the former, other areas 
can replicate ElHaggana’s “street-by-street” organizing strategy, to build-up and operationalize 
social capital in the area; as well as local CDAs engagement with municipalities. While 
ElHaggana’s community leaders can promptly tackle quality and maintenance issues that could 
avoid leading to situations in Gizah where contamination, leakages and breaks are common.  
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Chapter 6- Policy Implications 
Recognizing the diversity of problems facing local communities in previous sections and the 
main axes of analysis, this section will look at some of the recommendations to improve policies 
regarding informality in general and informal upgrading specifically. The bulk of this section 
will look at potential government reform avenues, and also discuss improvements to aid-led 
interventions, potential local community organizing schemes, and societal and class paradigms. 
Governmental Policy Changes 
Although many hopes were expressed for government reform and a new social justice paradigm 
after the 25
th
 January Revolution, as well as with Egypt's first freely elected president, they are 
yet to materialize. It seems “post-revolutionary governments have continued the old regime’s 
approach to these (informal) areas- neglect, marginalization and failed proscription” (Sims, 2012, 
p.283) and public policies targeting informality have followed suit. However, if we are not to 
follow in Mike Davis’s vein with a “treason of the state” approach, nor to classify local NGOs 
and local government as being uncooperative in tackling these issues, we must seek alternative 
feasible policies that need to be put forth (Satterthwaite, 2006, p.27). As seen from the literature, 
there is no clear winning silver bullet program that can solve the negative consequences of 
informality. What is needed is “painful” cooperation between all stakeholders, as well as 
learning from the Slum Dwellers International approach of engaging with “deep” government on 
all levels (Gasparre, 2011, p.792). Several axes for government reform are identified below. 
Financial Investment and Institutional Set-up  
It is well-known that most governments of developing countries do not have money to spare. The 
Egyptian case is no different, with the added burden of a 6-million-strong bureaucracy. As such 
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the government must distinguish between funds allocated for general issues of informality as 
well as those specifically targeting upgrading, including infrastructure. Regarding the latter, there 
are two options that the government can consider. The first is to exploit community resources 
and build on the grassroots investments that communities are willing to make. Developing 
different local programs to finance infrastructure upgrading has already started in international 
experiences, such as the Orangi Project where residents set up a Trust Fund under the name of 
the community. In Egypt, even developing a mechanism in which the community can match the 
reduced public investment in their area would be feasible in theory, though arguably not 
practicable in view of the bureaucracy. Also, it is not only about mobilizing resources, but “how 
these resources will be organized and used”, thus implicating good governance (UNHABITAT, 
2003, p.182). Again the case of Ismailia previously discussed in the literature sheds light on how 
if there is political will, both budget from the national government as well as community funds 
can be combined and used as efficiently as possible for upgrading. The obstacle faced here is 
how to replicate this pilot project in other governorates, and remove the prerequisite of having a 
strong governor to move forward the local urban agenda. 
The second is reprioritization. Since public money is a rare commodity, it should be directed 
towards the settlements that are the most populous, and not to half empty desert communities 
(Sims, 2012, p.132). As such simply reprioritizing budgetary allocations can solve many 
problems at little additional cost (Sims, 2012, p.270). The key word being “simple” yet, the fiscal 
processes of the Egyptian government are another dilemma that is yet to be tackled. Only 4.2 
percent of the national budget is allocated for the local administration budget, which can do very 
little (Sims, 2012, p.254). In addition, there has never been any kind of disaggregation of the 
budget to analyze how much is being spent on the urban poor versus rural or even the new desert 
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communities. Reaching a framework within which both pro-poor policies and budgeting can be 
allocated would be a great step towards fair distribution of scarce resources; but given the line-
item budgeting approach of the government, this will involve a large amount of painful 
restructuring. 
This brings us to the other question of the institutional set-up of the numerous government 
institutions that are involved in the upgrading paradigm, and the powers retained within each of 
these. The generic concepts of decentralization and devolution have been floating around 
government reform endeavors for years, but their lack of implementation cannot be felt more 
than with residents attempting to unravel the roles of the myriad agencies involved in service 
provision. With the added layer of state utility companies making this even more complex, a 
clear definition of responsibilities and accountability is imperative. At the lower end of 
expectations, even granting the chiefs of municipalities more powers could help processes move 
along and respond to residents’ needs faster. For example the governor of Ismailia was able to 
bypass many of the national bureaucratic processes during the upgrading experiences in the 
governorate, which aided their success; but unfortunately it has not been institutionalized, nor 
can we assume that it could without nation-wide reforms. 
Inclusive Upgrading Policies and Processes 
As previously discussed in the literature review, the concept of “inclusive” processes seems to be 
the direction that many governments and donors are adopting to improve their current upgrading 
programs as part of the participation “orthodoxy” in development. However, the first issue that 
must be addressed is the question of “to recognize or not to recognize” which will encompass 
policies impacting informality as a whole and not only informality. Currently, government 
officials are continuing their denial of dealing with informality as the official norm of the city. 
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As Sims (2012) indicates "the rise and dominance of the informal, and the inability of the 
government to deal with it, to channel it, or even to extract positive elements is due to continued 
self-delusion” (p.272). This is also puzzling because the government has already taken official 
steps to connect infrastructure to these areas, and if “that is not state acceptance, then what is?” 
(Sims, 2012, p.132). it seems as though in other developing countries, the move towards policies 
for upgrading stipulated that informal institutions should be legitimized by the government and 
included in the planning processes (Van Horen, 2000, p.389). The experience in upgrading 
Besters Camp in South Africa showed how improvements came about where “planning, tenure 
delivery and public participation” were all avenues that the government invested in to bring 
about engagement with the public (Van Horen, 2000, p.390). Hence, infrastructure upgrading 
policies unintentionally brought about the state shift in policies towards informality as a whole 
towards recognition. As per an interview with Sims, since the Egyptian government seems to be 
a long way off from accepting the status quo, they could adopt the “provision, not recognition” 
approach and simply treat these areas as they do with formal or desert communities and use the 
nomenclature they want. Therefore, a compromise must be reached between the current blockage 
of access to services to full-on acceptance of these areas and integration. The avenues that would 
allow this to happen would be through community pressure to install infrastructure and constant 
dialogue on reaching installment schemes with state companies on the one hand; as well as local 
municipalities pressure on the national government on the other. 
 As such, it is important to look at the different levels of government we are addressing. 
The GTZ decision-makers guide identified three levels of government- local, regional 
(governorate administrations) and national (2010); and each of these have their respective 
interests and dilemmas. The local government, especially, plays a large role in promoting public 
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participation in local processes and decision-making. This is since they are aware that residents 
of a particular area have the knowledge and expertise of what works for them. An American 
researcher in a local urban forum stressed that reaching even “collaborative policies” and not 
necessarily inclusive policies will be a big stepping stone to including the urban poor. 
Ultimately, if the community has greater influence “on what is done and by whom (…) this 
could transform the quality, scale and cost-effectiveness of development assistance; eventually 
building governance systems from the bottom up” (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.128). 
 Yet as we strive to make “local government organizations more pro-poor- or less anti 
poor” (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.103), the interests of the government must not also be forgotten. As 
a government official put it “the government has to be a winner” in these processes. This is why 
as one of the experts mentioned inclusiveness can only come through social accountability. This 
is where both players are on equal footing and not just superficially represented, and the 
government can ultimately contract the people to implement its projects through a transparent 
system. The expert noted that the problem with the government is not its resources; it is on the 
other hand an inherent dilemma with its system and implementation through corrupt officials. 
 In the GTZ decision-makers’ guide (2010), different forms of inclusiveness have been 
detailed to allow the community to be in the “driver’s seat” or at least a partner with local 
government. These include providing the self-help initiatives with government grants to 
complement their resources; participation in all the phases of a project cycle including needs 
assessment, planning and budgeting, and even management of public facilities;  and impact 
monitoring and evaluation (GTZ, 2010, pp.23-69). At the same time, it is of course essential to 
have the government be treated as a permanent partner in these processes and not be limited to 
attempting to gain foot in already established local informal systems. This is particularly clear in 
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the case of guaranteeing the quality of the self-help structures, which have serious public health 
problems that are already arising in different areas. 
Macro-level Dilemmas 
In addition to the above mentioned implications, there are also the usual inherent problems of 
dealing with informality as a whole through the government, which need long-term solutions and 
the political backing to even begin unraveling them. These include the capacities of local 
government officials, enforcement of the rule of law, improvements to accessibility of poorer 
income groups to employment opportunities (Satterthwaite, 2006, p.28) and of course corruption. 
The latter is particularly significant since as residents reported they cannot make any financial 
decisions without figuring in the cut for the local officials. Indeed they echo Sims’s (2012) 
thoughts- “the government is not there to better their lives; advancement is based on connections 
and bribes" (p.252). 
Ultimately, it is clear that both the government and community will continue to implement their 
respective interventions and as the state struggles with service provision it would seem that it 
should turn to the local communities for financing and decision-making. Local municipalities 
already have an established relationship within these areas, despite being rocky and based on 
corruption and mutual benefits; but recognition of this at the national level should take place in 
order to officially shift these interactions to being actual partnerships. By removing difficulties in 
formalization, the basics of trust can begin to form and the integration of the formal into the 
informal, not the opposite, can take place to construct systems that are pro-poor.  
Implications for Bilateral and Aid Organizations 
Although the programs of aid agencies were not the main theme of study in this research, 
however both the literature and interviewees expressed various opinions and critiques of aid-led 
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interventions in tackling informality as a whole. Despite the number of programs even in Egypt 
alone that target the urban poor, only a couple of aid agencies stand out as being regularly 
engaged in informal areas, GIZ being the most sustainable. Hence since most of these agencies 
are bound together to achieve the MDGs at the global level, their ground operations suggest that 
they seem to “ignore the urban bits” and prefer to work on rural poverty, which may be more 
relevant to the MDGs  (Satterthwaite, 2003,p.184). Hence redirecting and developing programs 
that target the urban poor and informality as a whole are preliminary steps which aid agencies 
should advance their thinking to reflect new urban realities.  
This does not necessarily mean an increase in aid money, but rather a look at how this 
money is being spent and who uses it on behalf of the poor (Satterthwaite, 2003,p.184). Most 
official development agencies lack the administrative structure to cope with many small projects 
as they were set up to provide assistance to governments and so “lack the structure to support 
low-income households and community initiatives” (Satterthwaite, 1996). As such, developing 
institutional capacity or maybe even pilot departments to experiment with dealing directly with 
local communities could be a potential path for these agencies. The Inter-American Foundation 
which operates in Haiti, Latin America and the Caribbean is a good example of this type of 
bottom-up assistance. 
Therefore donors can shift towards what is known as localizing the MDGs and move 
from “quick wins”, to supporting local choices and priorities developed by local organizations, 
both formal and informal, in which poorer income groups have real influence. They would face 
the challenge of figuring out how they would be able to firstly access these areas, and secondly 
how they can support “encouraging, catalyzing and legitimating the diverse local processes 
through which the needs and priorities of the urban poor are identified and addressed” 
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(Satterthwaite, 2003, p.189-190). As such they can play the role of the middleman on the one 
hand supporting local solutions, and on the other having leverage with the government to 
negotiate changes in policies (Satterthwaite, 2003,p.190). Of course, given today’s climate in 
Egypt with regards to civil society and conspiracies of foreign intervention, extra caution must 
be taken so that donors are not accused of interfering in internal affairs. 
Implications for Local Organizations 
Just as donors are currently identifying the extent of freedom they have in Egypt’s new political 
climate, local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are also feeling the wrath of negative attitudes 
towards their activities. Developmental CSOs are currently escaping the radar, and local CDAs 
are rarely a source of interest to the government, given their smaller sizes and funding. Little 
research has been done on local CDAs in urban areas and the impact they have on the local 
developmental processes, and it was a surprise to find for example that in ElHaggana alone there 
were estimates of 35 cooperatives functioning. Also the staff of Nur ElMashreq themselves were 
at various points in time part of different CDAs, and continue to believe in the importance of 
creating these organizations that belong to the community. The GTZ strategy also stressed that 
these organizations can be the vehicle through which local self-help initiatives can be promoted, 
and at the same time their capacities strengthened (2010, p.50). 
Hence, there are high hopes that these CDAs would begin to form coalitions of the urban 
poor. These will be particularly effective as they will give “voice” to the residents of these areas 
and help them consolidate their demands as one group with which the government can partner 
(Satterthwaite, 2005, p.111). Slum Dwellers International has already started to partner in Egypt 
with a cooperative in Manshiet Nasr, and hopefully this trend will continue. However, as 
previously mentioned by Sims, the ability of Egyptian communities to come together in 
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solidarity working groups has not been sustainable, although given the situation post-Revolution, 
there is reason to hope for higher sense of community solidarity. After the security vacuum 
during the Revolution days gave room for local committees per neighborhood and street to 
organically emerge, this may be the stepping stone toward stronger community ties.   
When looking at both the Orangi, SDI and Ismailia models, it seems as though active 
organizations like Nur ElMashreq are adopting the same approach identified by Satterthwaite 
(2005, p. 116), changing the way official provision worked to be affordable for low-income 
households. Its staff continues to believe that the government should allow them legal ways in 
which they could get external funding and donations for developmental projects and so save the 
state funds and at the same time partner with them to get services to the area. 
Societal and Class Paradigms 
There is clear stereotyping in many of the stories that emerge from the slums and those that are 
also spoken by government officials. This seems to be the case across the board as in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America; those that are providing the cities with the cheap goods and services 
available in the informal spheres are discriminated against (Satterthwaite, 2005, p.105). As they 
stereotype against them, these “anti-poor attitudes” lead both to routine forced evictions, as well 
as society-wide social exclusion and infusion of false beliefs to the elites and the urban middle 
class (Satterthwaite, 2005,p.106). As such, it is imperative that both the government and civil 
society take the lead in promoting public awareness campaigns, media material showing 
informality in a positive light, experiential school programs with projects in informal areas, and a 
clear cultural push for a pro-poor society. These are of course programs for long-term impact that 
aim to change behaviors, attitudes and correct misconceptions.  
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 Chapter 7- Conclusion 
Cairo under different lenses is viewed as one of the noteworthy stories of megacities that 
continue to work despite dysfunctional policies and a worn out bureaucracy. Sims (2012) 
attributes this success, and rightly so, to “the operation of informal processes” even though they 
are prohibited by law (p.268).  
But reading about informality is inherently different than experiencing it firsthand with 
residents that battle every day to reach even the most basic of services. Through the case studies 
presented in this research, the struggle to survive is a daily one that residents have to endure in 
order to fend for themselves under the radar of bribe-seeking authorities. Informal processes are 
what helped these communities  rely on themselves, build social networks, develop ambiguous 
and at times contradictory relationships with municipalities and change rigid formal systems that 
are simply not suitable for implementation (Sims, 2012, p.268). 
The research also shed light on the internal struggles communities go through within 
themselves. Sometimes banding together to face governments, but other times stopping each 
other from infringing on one another's self-help structures for their own survival interests; 
residents are in a constant tug of war to live a ‘normal’ life. Profiteers emerged at different times 
during the community’s struggle, but natural leaders with initiative slowly made them irrelevant 
as they changed the residents from consumers to ‘owners’ of their own services. Despite low 
expectations of Egyptian community organizing to take authority especially after the Revolution, 
examples of the community coming together provide a basis for future development of local 
engagement. 
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In addition, a main emergent theme was that of the duality of governmental attitudes and 
policies as expressed with the study’s original conceptual framework in Figure 2. While in some 
cases the authorities held steadfast to their position that all slums should be resettled and will 
thus be treated with neglect till then; others have realized that dealing with the communities is 
much more effective, and causes less headaches.  Many cases in literature and international 
development have proven that slum participation is in fact effective, and even more so a step 
towards societal progress. As Turner indicated decades ago, if informal area residents “control 
major decisions” and contribute to “design, construction and management, this will stimulate 
both individual and societal well-being (Gasparre, 2011, p.784). On the other hand, if the urban 
poor “lack voice, influence, rights and protection by the rule of law” they will never actually be 
beneficiaries from aid money, national progress or emerging markets (Satterthwaite, 2005, 
p.128). This materialized in Egypt through the Ismailia experience that allowed financing both 
by the government and citizens, as well as collaborative planning strategies. The concept of 
“reverse participation” emerged where the government became the party that was attempting to 
find access to the already established informal processes. As such, the study of social capital, 
local informal networks and intangible local resources has become a recent area of research as 
well as a component in development programs. 
 With the increasing significance of social capital both in literature and in development 
programs, this indicates the necessity of developing in-depth understanding of cities. Sims 
(2012) provided a stepping stone in his book as it began to peel back the layers of informality in 
Cairo. He also encouraged his readers to begin asking “why” questions such as “why certain 
processes (…) develop organically out of the activities and desires of the majority of city 
dwellers and can succeed in spite of government irrelevance” (Sims, 2012, p.273). 
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 The present study provided a preliminary look into the “how” of informal processes 
related to infrastructure and utilities. Yet there is a vast body of potential research that remains 
untouched regarding informality in Cairo and the grassroots operations between state and 
community. As such there is great need for a variety of issues to be tackled such as beginning to 
quantify community financing and setting a metric for gehood zateya; mapping of the networks 
of gehood zateya initiatives including those in ElHaggana; looking in particular at sewage 
systems where Sims believes is the real grassroots investment (expert interview); tracing local 
government policy-making and implementation; documenting areas with intertwining informal 
and formal infrastructures (e.g. 3 and 4 water pipes); the “politics of informality” such as by 
looking at the workings of local CDAs, community leaders and political actors; and the invisible 
and largely untapped potential of the Female Heads of Households and youth in these areas. Two 
main areas of potential research that emerged from the analysis of the case studies are the quality 
levels of self-help initiatives and documenting health risks, as well as the incremental networking 
processes. The latter is particularly interesting when compared to the characteristics of other 
informal networks such as those supporting the creation of businesses or ROSCAs. 
 Nevertheless, a conscious effort must be made to avoid the “over-romanticizing” of 
informal areas and giving exaggerated credit to their systems (Sims, 2012). As previously 
mentioned, although these systems have in fact saved local communities' time, money and even 
lives; they are quite simply contributing to Sims’s notion of “sub-optimal development”. They 
simply cannot replace government systems, yet since the authorities are more than often broke 
and do not have the manpower to reach localities, this is where effective collaborations can take 
place. “Grassroots Public-Private-Partnerships,” to borrow Bremer's term, could be the channel 
for both new public management and community engagement (2013). The dilemma lies in the 
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lack of trust on both sides, safe spaces for real cooperation and a rule of law that is malleable 
enough to incorporate grassroots ingenuity into legal realms. 
 In conclusion, it is imperative to realize that when talking about these processes and 
existing dichotomies between state and informality, the people are those that ultimately matter. 
Throughout this research, the author was exposed to how people’s fates are easily forgotten in 
the myriad of policies and decision-making whether in the government or in the informal areas 
themselves. One cannot help but be touched on seeing the breakdown into tears of one of the 
beneficiaries as she described an illness she believes is a result of poor water quality (whether or 
not this is the true cause) or learning of the death of two community workers in the Orangi 
Project in Karachi while this research was being written. Both incidents brought home the reality 
of informality. Putting the public’s well-being at the center of policies, regardless of where they 
live or how they came there, is a change that Cairo and all governorates in Egypt will inevitably 
have to go through. 
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Annex 1- Informality in Cairo 
 
Source: Sims, 2012, p.60. 
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Annex 2- Largest Informal Areas 
 
Source: Sims, 2012, p.127. 
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Annex 3- Population Growth in Cairo 
 
Source: Sims, 2012, p.83. 
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Annex 4- Location of Izbit ElHaggana 
Source: Wikimapia, 2013. Accessed: 12/5/2013 
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Annex 5- Location of Nur ElMashreq CDA 
Accessed: 12/5/2013 
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